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The'manager's brains are under the workman's cap.
William "Big Bill" Haywood'
The workmen in each of these trades have had their knowl-
edge handed down to them by word of mouth .... The inge-
nuity and experience of each generation ... have without
doubt handed over better methods to the next. This mass of
rule-of-thumb or traditional knowledge may be said to be the
principal asset or possession of every tradesman.... [The]
foremen and superintendents know, better than any one
f Professor of Law and William Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
I have received good advice and counsel on this Article from Erwin Chemerinsky,
Daniel Ernst, Richard Hasen, Gillian Lester, Samuel Pillsbury, Stephen Siegel, Kenneth
Sokoloff, Lawrence Solum, and Clyde Spillenger, from participants at the Loyola Law
School and UCLA Law School faculty colloquia, and at the annual meetings of the Ameri-
can Society for Legal History (1997) and the Law & Society Association (1996). Robin
Diem, Michael LeBoff, and, especially, Geoffrey Moore provided superb research assis-
tance. If errors remain, notwithstanding all their efforts, the fault is mine alone.
William D. Haywood and Frank Bohn, Industrial Socialism 25 (Charles H. Kerr ed no
date). This quote is found in David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America: Studies in the
history of work, technology and labor struggles 9 (Cambridge 1979). Haywood was a leader of
the radical Western Federation of Miners and, later, a founder and leader of the Industrial
Workers of the World ("Wobblies"), a radical national labor union in the early twentieth cen-
tury. See generally Joseph R. Conlin, Big Bill Haywood and the Radical Union Movement
(Syracuse 1969); Melvin Dubofsky, Big Bill"Haywood (Manchester 1987).
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else, that their own knowledge and personal skill falls far
short of the combined knowledge and dexterity of all the
workmen under them.
Frederick Winslow Taylor
Employees develop knowledge at work that may be made
more valuable to an employer if it is not shared with other firms.
Employers want monopoly control over the products of their em-
ployees' human capital, and a variety of legal doctrines help them
get it. Among these doctrines is the law governing ownership of
patents.' Perhaps the most significant legal constraints on em-
ployees' freedom during and after an employment relationship
are the restrictions on employees' ability to use for themselves or
to sell to others the knowledge they acquired on the job. How em-
ployees and employers have used law in their struggle over own-
ership and control of economically valuable ideas is an important
and little-explored chapter of the legal, social, and economic his-
tory of American labor and industrialization.
The modem law was forged in the crucible where patent
law's egalitarianism collided with the hierarchical premises of the
law of master and servant. The law of employee inventions is an
unstable mixture of the two bodies of law, the former honoring
the rights of the inventor as employee, the latter being skeptical
of the rights of the employee as inventor. The democratic, free la-
bor spirit of the patent system reflects its status as a foundation
of American economic development and an icon of American free-
dom in the nineteenth century. As Abraham Lincoln famously ob-
served, "In anciently inhabited countries, the dust of ages-a real
downright old-fogyism-seems to settle upon, and smother the in-
2 Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management 31-32 (Norton 1967)
(emphasis removed).
' This Article is part of a larger work in progress that focuses on the entire body of
law governing ownership of intellectual property in the context of the employment rela-
tionship, including trade secrets, covenants not to compete, and the various tort doctrines
regulating unfair competition. This body of law restricts employees from marketing their
skills to other employers. Works exploring the nineteenth century struggle between em-
ployers and employees include: Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73
Harv L Rev 625, 629-46 (1960); Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in
the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 Harv L
Rev 1510 (1980); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Bind-
ing Men's Consciences and Women's Fidelity, 101 Yale L J 775 (1992). Surprisingly, this is
the first history of the law respecting ownership of the inventions of the employee-
inventor. Jasper Silva Costa, The Law of Inventing in Employment (Central Book 1953),
surveyed the law as it stood in the early 1950s, but did not delve much into its history.
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tellects and energies of man. But in America, he asserted, we
had broken the "shackles" of the "slavery of mind" and had estab-
lished "a habit of freedom of thought" that was necessary to the
"discovery and production of new and useful things. The patent
law nourished this habit of free thought by allowing the ingen-
ious to profit; it added "the fuel of interest to the fire of genius."'
Lincoln's view of patent law as the free labor ideology of the
ingenious tinkerer may seem to be at odds with the hierarchical
rules of master-servant law that applied at the time if the
tinkerer happened to be someone's employee. To an extent sur-
prising in light of the otherwise bleak legal status of nineteenth
century employees, courts awarded employees property rights in
their inventions. But, by the early twentieth century, the master-
servant ideology had dampened the free labor spirit of the patent
law. Thus, when Lincoln's words were written in stone above the
portal to the U.S. Patent Office in 1932, the fuel of interest had
been all but removed from the fire of the employee-inventor's
genius.' As one critic complained in 1949, "Today it would be
more correct to say that the patent system adds another instru-
ment of control to the well-stocked arsenal of monopoly interests
... [because] it is the corporations, not their scientists, that are
the beneficiaries of patent privileges."' Another critic accused
corporations of using patents to suppress competition rather than
to encourage or reward invention.9 These critics lamented the
massive twentieth century shift of ownership of ideas from indi-
viduals to corporations; the change was partly accomplished by a
shift in ownership from individual entrepreneur-inventors to cor-
porate employers of inventors.0
4 Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb 11, 1859), in
Roy P. Basler, ed, 3 The Collected Works ofAbraham Lincoln 356, 363 (Rutgers 1953).
5 Id.
* Id.
This observation was made in David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technol-
ogy, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism 84 (Knopf 1977).
* Id.
See id at 84-85. The overwhelming majority of patents issued today go to corpora-
tions. See Rights of Employed Inventors, Hearing on HR 4732 and HR 6635 before the
House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 97th
Cong, 2d Sess 1 (1982) (remarks of Rep Robert Kastenmeier), quoting Patent Office report
stating that 84 percent of U.S. patents go to corporate assignees, "usually the employer of
the actual inventor." As recently as 1916, three-quarters of the patents in the United
States were issued to individuals. See Louis Galambos, The American Economy and the
Reorganization of the Sources of Knowledge, in Alexandra Oleson and John Voss, eds, The
Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860-1920 269, 277 (Johns Hopkins 1979).
" See Noble, America by Design at 87-109 (cited in note 7). The change reflects, of
course, beth the rise of the corporate form of business during the late nineteenth century,
see Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 446-59 (Simon & Schuster 1973),
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This Article examines the development of the law respecting
ownership of employee inventions during the American Industrial
Revolution of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It ex-
plores how employers and employees used law to define their re-
spective control over the knowledge-what is now called human
capital-that was often both the employee's and the employer's
most valuable asset.1' More specifically, this Article describes a
progression in three stages: first, the early nineteenth century
rule that employees usually owned the entire right to their inven-
tions; second, the later nineteenth century rule that employees
owned their inventions but employers often had a license to use
them (an arrangement known as a "shop right"); and third, the
twentieth century rule that employers own most employee inven-
tions.
This area of law is of considerable importance today, not only
in knowledge-based industries, but also throughout the econ-
omy. 2 Employees create the overwhelming majority of patented
inventions, but most employees who invent are bound by con-
and the increased percentage of the population that was employed by others. On the
growth of the percentage of the population employed by others in the antebellum era, see
Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic 259
(Cambridge 1993) ("By midcentury, on and off the farm, it seems likely that the proportion
of productively engaged Americans employed by others-about one-third in 1820-had in-
creased to about one-half. In Eastern industrializing states... the proportion was proba-
bly closer to three-fourths.") (citation omitted).
" This Article does not address copyright, although copyright law has confronted some
of the same problems of attributing ownership or authorship between employer and em-
ployee. Recent post-structuralist literary criticism has led to new legal and historical
study of the social and legal construction of the notion of authorship. See, for example,
Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi, eds, The Construction of Authorship: Textual Ap-
propriation in Law and Literature (Duke 1994) (including essays both historical and non-
historical that discuss the legal concept of authorship); Mark Rose, Authors and Owners:
The Invention of Copyright (Harvard 1993) (discussing legal evolution of literary property
in the eighteenth century). Copyright law appears to have been rather less generous to the
employee-author than patent law has been to the employee-inventor. See, for example,
Community for Creative Non-Violence v Reid, 490 US 730, 737 (1989) (observing that un-
der the work-for-hire rule of the Copyright Act, the author or artist has no claim to his or
her work).
12 See, for example, Steven Cherensky, Comment, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Em-
ployee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 Cal
L Rev 595, 598 (1993) (discussing the allocation of property rights in the corporate work-
place and criticizing the contract law approach); Henrik D. Parker, Note, Reform for
Rights of Employed Inventors, 57 S Cal L Rev 603, 605 (1984) (discussing the development
of the law of allocating patent rights in the employer-employee context, and urging reform
"to increase inventive output"); Paul C. Van Slyke and Mark M. Friedman, Employer's
Rights to Inventions and Patents of its Officers, Directors and Employees, 18 Am Intell
Prop L Assn Q J 127, 128-47 (1990) (advising practitioners on how to determine patent
rights in employer-employee context). See also Edmund W. Kiteh, The Law and Economics
of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J Legal Stud 683 (1980); John C. Stedman, Comment,
Rights and Responsibilities of the Employed Inventor, 45 Ind L J 254 (1974).
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tracts requiring them to assign the patents to their employers."
Employees are often appalled to discover that an employer who
discouraged or ignored a wild idea can then claim to own that
idea when it later turns out to be patentable and lucrative. One
laboratory assistant recently made headlines when he chose to go
to jail rather than to comply with a court order by relinquishing
his invention to his employer. His employer had discouraged him
from working on the project; when the resulting invention turned
out to be worth millions of dollars, however, the employer de-
manded that the employee assign the patent, as his employment
contract provided, even though the employee had developed the
invention on his own time. 4
Even employees who are not bound by a pre-invention as-
signment contract usually do not own the entire right to their in-
ventions. The modern shop right rule gives the employer a roy-
alty-free license to use the invention if the employee used the
employer's facilities or work time in perfecting the invention. For
example, the Samsonite Corporation obtained a license to the
patents for improved luggage that a shop foreman had invented,
because he had designed the inventions on company time with
company material. 5 Similarly, a court held that a mechanical en-
gineer who designed an improved pump for spraying chocolate to
create M&M candies had accorded a shop right to M&M-even
though he was employed by a third party when he designed the
pump and worked in the M&M plant only as an independent con-
tractor. 6 Even a lowly general laborer, whose duties included
unloading trucks and sweeping floors, discovered he could not
prevent his employer from using his patented process for remov-
ing worms from pecans because he developed the idea while at
work.'7 Finally, a Stair Glide employee who solved a problem of
falling Stair Glide elevator chairs defeated the company's claim to
a shop right only by showing that his boss had expressly forbid-
den him to work on the device during company time, leading him
13 See, for example, Robert L. Gullette, State Legislation Governing Ownership Rights
in Inventions Under Employee Invention Agreements, 62 J Pat Off Society 732, 738-39
(1980); William P. Hovell, Note, Patent Ownership: An Employer's Rights to His Em-
ployee's Invention, 58 Notre Dame L Rev 863, 864 (1983); Parker, Note, 57 S Cal L Rev at
608 (cited in note 12). See also Rights of Employed Inventors, 97th Cong, 2d Sess at 1 (re-
marks of Rep Kastenmeier) (cited in note 9).
"Leon Jaroff, Intellectual Chain Gang, Time 64 (Feb 10, 1997).
15 Hewett v Samsonite Corp, 32 Colo App 150, 507 P2d 1119, 1120-22 (1973). However,
the court denied the company ownership of the patent because the foreman was not hired
to invent.
16 Crowe v M&MIMars, 242 NJ Super 592, 577 A2d 1278, 1279-81 (1990).
7 Wommack v Durham Pecan Co, Inc, 715 F2d 962, 963-64, 971 (5th Cir 1983).
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to do all the work at home and on his lunch hour." As late as the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, all of these em-
ployees likely would have won their cases because they did not
voluntarily allow their employers to use their ideas.
Then as now, some courts said that if an employee was hired
specifically to invent, the employer owned the invention. But,
while modern courts looking at the facts of many nineteenth cen-
tury cases would probably find that the employee had been hired
to invent, relatively few nineteenth century courts reached such a
conclusion. Even those courts that did conclude that the employee
had been hired to invent often awarded the invention to the em-
ployee and only a shop right to the employer. 9 In short, compared
to nineteenth century courts, twentieth century courts are much
more willing to find that an employee was hired specifically to in-
vent and to find that an employer is entitled to a shop right based
on the relation between the employment and the invention.
The turn of the twentieth century also marked a profound
change in the dominant mode of reasoning. Courts in the mid-
nineteenth century emphasized the property right of inventors,
but by the end of the century courts emphasized the contract of
employment.0 A related change was a lesser emphasis on the
status of the employee and a greater emphasis on the terms of
the employment contract. In the early cases legal outcomes de-
pended on how the court characterized the employee: as "an in-
genious person" possessed of "inventive skill," on the one hand, or
as a mere "mechanic" on the other. But by 1933 the Supreme
Court thought it a truism that "[t]he respective rights and obliga-
tions of employer and employee, touching an invention conceived
by the latter, spring from the contract of employment."2'
There are three overlapping conceptual stages in the devel-
opment of the law respecting the inventions of the employee-
inventor. The first was the period between roughly 1840 and the
"S Dewey v American Stair Glide Corp, 557 SW2d 643, 645-48 (Mo Ct App 1977).
" The United States Supreme Court, for example, determined in two late nineteenth
century opinions that an employee who was hired to invent something and made an inven-
tion owned the rights to the invention, while the employer acquired only a shop right. In
both cases the Court declined to grant an injunction ordering the employee to assign the
patent to the employer. Hapgood v Hewitt, 119 US 226, 233-34 (1886); Dalzell v Dueber
Watch-Case Manufacturing Co, 149 US 315, 324-26 (1893).
"On the nineteenth century transition from the English law's treatment of employ-
ment as a fully executed contract of hiring (in which the terms of the employment rela-
tionship are not contractually determined) to the view of the employment contract as ex-
ecutory (in which contract governs all terms of employment), see John V. Orth, Contract
and the Common Law, in Harry N. Scheiber, ed, The State and Freedom of Contract (Stan-
ford forthcoming).
" United States v Dubilier Condenser Corp, 289 US 178, 187 (1933).
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mid-1880s, when the inventor's status as an employee was irrele-
vant to ownership of inventions, and the shop right was a varia-
tion on equitable estoppel rather than a doctrine of employment
law. Although the modern employer's shop right flows directly
from the fact of employment when the employee uses the em-
ployer's material and facilities in developing the invention, origi-
nally the shop right was a license that existed only through the
employee's acquiescence. In many cases the existence of an em-
ployment relationship was irrelevant to the court's analysis.
The second period began in the 1880s, when courts began to
attend more to the nature and existence of the employment rela-
tionship when deciding ownership of inventions. In this period,
the employer could claim a shop right, and even outright owner-
ship of an employee's invention, based on the employment rela-
tionship. Courts more frequently concluded that the employer
had hired the employee to invent and thus had bought, through
wages or salary, the products of the employee's inventive efforts.
Yet courts during this period remained protective of the em-
ployee's claim to own the invention, awarding shop rights only
warily.
The third period, which began at the turn of the century, is
marked by the dominance of contract as the method of analyzing
invention ownership. The development of a body of law of em-
ployment contracts, covering all aspects of the employment rela-
tionship, made it much easier for courts to conclude that employ-
ers could and did validly contract to own their employees' inven-
tions.
This conceptual evolution calls for an explanation of why the
law developed as it did. The changing rhetoric and rationales of
the judges' opinions suggest that a number of forces-both exoge-
nous and endogenous to the legal system-were at work. The
changing cultural image of the nature of invention influenced
judges' views both about who was the likely inventor and about
what allocation of patent rights was most conducive to economic
development. The early view was that an invention was the dis-
crete product of a single individual's genius; the modern view is
that invention is often the product of many people's work on a
corporate research project. In some respects, this is another chap-
ter of the by-now traditional story of how nineteenth century
judges used law instrumentally to promote economic develop-
ment.2 Employee-inventors tended to be middle-class skilled
See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860
(Harvard 1977) ("Transformation I"). On the patent system in particular, see B. Zorina
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workers and proto-entrepreneurs rather than working class la-
borers; as a result, employee-inventors did better in this little
corner of the law than employees more generally did elsewhere in
the Gilded Age legal regime. This is a group who benefited from
the legal and political ideology of free labor that pervaded post-
bellum America. Judges thought protecting employees' property
rights in their ideas would likely produce faster economic devel-
opment than would occur if the law granted the property right to
the inventor's employer.
But the relationship between the legal and social changes
that occurred on the border between patent and employment law
during these one hundred years is more complicated than the
traditional story of the instrumental use of law. For the concep-
tual structure of the law itself influenced the development of the
legal doctrine in this area. The legal rules articulated in the pat-
ent acts and caselaw, as well as the practices of the Patent Office
and the patent bar, offered both a cognitive structure and an ide-
ology about individual ownership of ideas that significantly influ-
enced how courts regarded inventive employees. The legal catego-
ries of the patent law-the inventor, and the notion of a novel
idea as property-shaped the bench's and bar's perceptions of the
source and nature of ideas and of the existence of property rights
in ideas. The patent law required that the "first and true inven-
tor" be named in the patent application; this made it easy for
judges and lawyers to identify the employee as the rightful owner
of the idea. Other legal categories-notably the rise of contract in
employment law-later contributed to changing legal perceptions
of the employee-inventor, particularly as late in the century em-
ployers began using written contracts to structure their relation-
ships with their employees. In addition, the rise of the corporate
form enabled courts to see the creation and ownership of ideas as
a collective enterprise, rather than in terms of individual inven-
tors.
This Article is based primarily on reported American judicial
opinions on the ownership of inventions in the context of any kind
of employment relationship before 1930, as well as on treatises
and other materials published by and for lawyers.' The impor-
Khan, Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 55 J
Econ Hist 58, 93 (1995) ("If inventive activity were indeed responsive to material incen-
tives, then the legal system played an important part in stimulating greater technical
change by reinforcing the effectiveness of the patent system.").
"Both patent law and employment law were largely judge-made throughout the nine-
teenth century. Judicial opinions are thus the primary materials to study. Although Con-
gress enacted the first Patent Act in 1790, the statute was not comprehensive. Congress
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tance of common law doctrine as an ideology in the nineteenth
century doubtless varies from subject to subject. Others have
made a compelling case that the ideology of master-servant law
influenced nineteenth century workplace power relationships,
and, more generally, class and political relationships.' Patent
law seems to be another area where legal doctrine significantly
shaped social perceptions of the nature and value of ideas, al-
though, unlike labor law, it has not captured the interest of many
legal historians. That ideas could be the property of a person or a
firm-the concept of intellectual property-was first a legal con-
cept and then a social fact. Patents clearly contributed to the rei-
fication of ideas as things, as property, and as valuable commodi-
ties because patent law decided which ideas deserved economi-
cally valuable monopoly protection and which did not. 6 Patent
law thus adopted the Romantic notion of the individual as the in-
ventor or originator of an idea, and turned it into a legal category
that supported a whole system of property rights, thus turning a
legal category back into a social fact. Legal involvement was inte-
gral to the entire social practice, for it prevented the duplication
that could undermine the value of an innovation. Consequently,
inventors sought patents. One might form an agreement or con-
duct a business with little express involvement of lawyers,
judges, or the state, but one could not obtain a patent without
legislated little on the subject for decades after the revision of the patent laws in 1836.
The statute entirely neglected employment law aspects of patent. Thus, to whatever ex-
tent Congress and the Patent Office were important in shaping patent law in other areas,
the problem of sorting out competing employer and employee claims to patents was left
largely to the judiciary. The tasks of developing a coherent structure and ofjustifying it to
the people whose rights were affected was left to the common law adjudication process.
See Friedman, A History of American Law at 379-81 (cited in note 10). In most of the cases
that comprise this study, there was no jury because the plaintiff sued in equity. In some,
especially the contract cases in Section II, however, the case was submitted to a jury. In
the main, judges appear to have been a far more significant influence on patent ownership
than juries.
See, for example, Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology at 225-29 (cited in note 10)
(noting that the common law's particular concerns became accepted as a form of expertise
that affected the early American republic's political, social, and economic debates, and
that the law of master and servant articulated a hierarchical view about work relation-
ships that was in conflict with, but ultimately changed, early republican notions of free-
dom and equality).
' See, for example, William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor
Movement (Harvard 1991); Victoria C. Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Ori-
gins of Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton 1993); Karen Orren, Belated
Feudalism: Labor, the Law and Liberal Development in the United States (Cambridge
1991).
' See Christine MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent
System, 1660-1800 (Cambridge 1988) (discussing the evolution of the English patent sys-
tem, which was a partial model for the American system).
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them. Patent, as much as, 'or even more than employment,
seems to be an area where strong claims can be made for the so-
cial significance of legal categories and of legal doctrine as ideol-
ogy.
A caveat about terminology is in order. To group all these
cases together as confronting "employer and employee" issues is a
shorthand that risks obscuring important distinctions. There
were many different types of employees in the cases. Some were
mechanics and laborers who probably were not paid much; others
were highly trained chemists and engineers, high-level supervi-
sors and factory foremen, well-compensated partners, or directors
and officers of the employer firm. Few were at the bottom of the
labor market; most were middling sorts; and some were near the
top. Lumping all of these people into the category of "employee" is
misleading if it suggests to the reader that all these inventor-
employees were, and were perceived by judges as, working class. I
have run that risk because the courts ultimately came to regard
employment per se as determinative in many cases. The fact of
employment either entitled the employer to the invention (in the
twentieth century) or did not (in the nineteenth), but (except in
certain cases, as explained below) the employee's status in the
firm did not matter, at least not overtly.
But the employee-inventor's social position did matter when
the courts determined whether the employee was in fact the in-
ventor. The early cases regarded the problem of allocating owner-
ship simply as one of fact: to determine whether the employer or
the employee had had the fundamental idea of the invention. In
these cases, the employee's skill level and social position were re-
garded as highly relevant in discerning his potential for creativity
and inventiveness. As George Curtis explained in his 1849 Trea-
tise on the Law of Patents, determining patent ownership as be-
tween employer and employee "depends upon the relative situa-
tions of the parties, the nature of the employment.' At a deeper
level, however, the fact that these employees were mainly men of
middling social position did matter in every case.' The rules that
Patents were heavily litigated in the nineteenth century. See Friedman, A History of
American Law at 379 (cited in note 10).
George Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Patents for Useful Inventions in the
United States of America § 49 at 42 (Little, Brown 1849) ("Curtis I").
' "Men" is used advisedly here, as are gendered pronouns. Just one of the cases dis-
cussed in this Article involved a female inventor. See Fry v Rockwood Pottery Co, 90 F 494,
494 (Cir Ct S D Ohio 1898), affd 101 F 723 (6th Cir 1900), discussed in note 88. One ought
not conclude, however, that female employees did not invent. Rather, it is likely that fe-
male employees' inventions were credited to their male co-workers or bosses or never
wound up in litigation. See Erik Arnold and Wendy Faulkner, Smothered by Invention:
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courts adopted can be attributed to the judicial unwillingness to
divest the creative man of his valuable asset, the property right
in the patent. To take that away might knock the employee off his
precarious perch amidst the ranks of independent artisans into
the masses of dependent wage laborers.
I. OWNERSHIP OF INVENTIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONTRACT
They all laughed at Christopher Columbus when he said the
world was round.
They all laughed when Edison recorded sound.
They all laughed at Wilbur and his brother when they said
that man could fly.
They told Marconi wireless was a phony.
It's the same old cry!
They all laughed at Rockefeller Center. Now they're fighting
to get in.
They all laughed at Whitney and his cotton gin.
They all laughed at Fulton and his steamboat, Hershey and
his chocorte bar.
Ford and his Lizzie kept the laughers busy-
That's how people are!
Ira Gershwin 0
The origins of the modem law governing ownership of em-
ployee inventions lie in general equitable rules and in interpreta-
tions of the early Patent Acts, not in the law of master and ser-
vant. The courts' first published efforts to sort out claims to own-
ership of employee inventions involved cases where the courts did
not identify any contract between the parties regarding owner-
ship of the inventions. The earliest of these cases, from the period
1840-1870, arose when employment as a single legal category was
nascent. There were multiple legal statuses-master and house-
hold servant; master, journeyman, and apprentice; corporation
and employee; partners, principal, and agent-that described dif-
ferent employment relationships; the rights and obligations of the
parties were not uniform across all categories.3' When the courts
Technology in Women's Lives 51-58 (Pluto 1985). The maleness of all these inventive em-
ployees may also have contributed to the relatively pro-employee bent in the law.
Ira Gershwin, They All Laughed, in Michael Feinstein, ed, Ira Gershwin Songbook
165 (Warner Bros 1984) (punctuation modified), from the film Shall We Dance (1937).
" According to Christopher Tomlins, the category of persons whom the law called
"servants" was quite small in the colonial period (mainly indentured servants), but the
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first approached competing claims to ownership of inventions, the
employment status of the inventor was not his most relevant
characteristic. Rather, the popular image of the inventor as a he-
roic genius shaped the law governing ownership of employee in-
ventions more profoundly than did the ideology of the master-
servant relationship.
Some inventors of the earliest patented United States inven-
tions doubtless were employed by others, but their employment
status does not appear from the available records.32 There are no
reported cases before 1843 in which an employer claimed, as
against an employee, ownership of a patent because the inventor
had been working for him at the time of the invention. 3 Even
once decisions about employee patents began to be reported, the
category expanded dramatically over the course of the nineteenth century. Tontlins, Law,
Labor, and Ideology at 255-70 (cited in note 10).
The multiple employment relationships and the possibility that "master" and "ser-
vant" had multiple meanings are discussed, with citations to numerous treatises, in Rob-
ert J. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor: The Employment Relation in English and
American Law and Culture, 1350-1870 17-22 (UNC 1991). Wood's 1877 and 1886 treatises
tried to create a unitary category of master-servant out of the multiple relations. H.G.
Wood, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant, Covering the Relation, Duties and Li-
abilities of Employers and Employees iii (John D. Parsons 1877) ("Wood I"); Id § 2 at 3
(Bancroft-Whitney 2d ed 1886) ("Wood IF). Tomlins notes that nineteenth century treatise
writers extended the concept of "servant" to apply to a large range of employed persons
who would not have been considered servants at the end of the eighteenth century. Tom-
lins, Law, Labor, and Ideology at 268 (cited in note 10).
' The Patent Office did not record the employment status of the patentee. See B.
Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, 'Schemes of Practical Utility: Entrepreneurship
and Innovation Among "Great Inventors" in the United States, 1790-1865, 53 J Econ Hist
289, 306 (1993).
' The first such case was McClurg v Kingsland, 42 US (1 How) 202 (1843). Willard
Phillips's influential patent treatise from 1837 did not mention the problem of determin-
ing patent ownership when the inventor was an employee. See Willard Phillips, The Law
of Patents for Inventions; Including the Remedies and Legal Proceedings in Relation to
Patent Rights 150-68 (American Stationers' 1837). He said only that "evidence that the
plaintiff's patent was for an invention made by a journeyman in his shop, with his con-
sent" would be "doubtless a good defence against a claim for damages for an infringe-
ment," though he cited no cases for this proposition. Id at 418-19.
It seems implausible that there were no such cases before 1843, but they evidently did
not capture the interest of the limited number of people who reported court decisions. In
the early nineteenth century, many court decisions were neither written nor reported. In
1784 or 1785, Connecticut became the first state to require that judges render written
opinions. See Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 50
(Oxford 1991) (claiming 1784); Erwin C. Surrency, A History of American Law Publishing
42 (Oceana 1990) (claiming 1785); Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar 328
(Little, Brown 1911) (crediting Connecticut with being the first state and passing the stat-
ute in 1785). Private reporters for Connecticut and Pennsylvania were first published in
1789. See Surrency, History of American Law Publishing at 40. In 1815, only half a dozen
states provided official court reporters and even then only for appellate courts. See Sellers,
The Market Revolution at 50. Accessible and uniform law emerged only well into the nine-
teenth century. See Surrency, History of American Law Publishing at 42-43.
118 [65:1127
The Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930
law was slow to evolve as a branch of employment or master-
servant. Rather, employers' interests in employee inventions
were protected under a provision of the Patent Act and a similar
equitable principle that forbade one who had voluntarily allowed
use of his invention to claim later that the user had no right to do
so. Not until the last quarter of the nineteenth century did courts
really begin to see the relevance of the inventor's status as an
employee. And even then courts regarded the inventor as an in-
ventor first and an employee second. Finally, at the end of the
nineteenth century, courts began to see that employers might
hire a person precisely because of his "inventive capacities" and
that the employer might therefore own the product of the em-
ployee's creativity. Until the early twentieth century, however,
courts remained reluctant to reach this conclusion.
A. The Myth of the Heroic Genius Inventor: Law and the Social
Practice of Invention in the Nineteenth Century
The patent law both reflected and reinforced the notion of in-
vention as a product of individual genius. Applicants for patents
had to state the name of the inventor; the law both assumed the
existence of, and required the patent applicant to identify, a per-
son (or persons) as the inventor." This notion that one or a few
specific individuals must have been the inventor reflected, to
some extent, the social practice of invention. Few firms made sys-
tematic efforts to develop ideas collectively.35 In the late nine-
teenth century, research laboratories dedicated to invention and
technological innovation-like Thomas Edison's famed laboratory
enclave at Menlo Park, New Jersey-were unusual.36 Their nov-
"The 1836 Patent Act required an inventor to make an 'oath or affirmation7 that he
believed he was "the original and first inventor" and that "he does not know or believe that
the same was ever before known or used....' Act of July 4, 1836 § 6, 5 Stat 117, 119. See
Curtis I § 172 at 268 (cited in note 28). The right of the "true inventor" to the patent comes
from the English Statute of Monopolies, which prohibited the monarch from granting mo-
nopolies except, inter alia, "to the first and true inventor or inventors" of "any manner of
new manufacture, within this realm.. . ." 21 James I, c 3 § 5, quoted in John Davies, A
Collection of the Most Important Cases Respecting Patents of Invention and the Rights of
Patentees 21 (W. Reed 1816).
3 In 1885, only 12 percent of patents were issued to corporations; by 1950, at least
three-quarters were. Noble, America by Design at 87 (cited in note 7). While this statistic
reflects in part the spread of the corporation, it also reflects in part a change in the social
practice of technological development.
' See Ronald R. Kline, Steinmetz: Engineer and Socialist 127-61 (Johns Hopkins 1992)
(chronicling development of GE Research Laboratories); John Rae, The Application of Sci-
ence to Industry, in Oleson and Voss, eds, The Organization of Knowledge 249, 258-64
(cited in note 9). For the leading research on the predominance of independent inventors
around the turn of the century, see Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inven-
tors, Firms, and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
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elty reinforced in the public mind the idea that individual effort,
not an organized and employer-sponsored research agenda, pro-
duced most inventions. Patent litigation further stimulated the
search for the individual inventor, 7 because one of the common
grounds for attacking either the Patent Office's decision to award
a patent or a patent's validity in defense of an infringement ac-
tion was to assert that the patentee was not the true or first in-
ventor." The legal structure thus invited patentees to identify, in
their legal documents as in their own minds, an invention as the
product of one person's genius, rather than as the product of a
collaborative process.
Correspondingly, patent users accused of infringement had
reason to argue that the patent was not based on the patentee's
own idea. As a result, among the earliest patent decisions that
addressed employee patent rights were cases in which the em-
ployer was the patentee and the defendant infringer argued that
the patent was invalid because a workman (who was not a party
to the litigation) had been the true inventor. The courts at-
tempted to develop a set of rules about when the suggestions or
contributions of the worker were so significant as to vitiate the
patentee-employer's claim to be the true inventor. The courts con-
cluded that the employer was entitled to the status of inventor so
long as the contributions of the employee "required no more skill
Century United States, in Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M.G. Raff, and Peter Temin, eds,
Learning by Doing in Firms, Markets, and Nations (Chicago forthcoming). See generally
Elizabeth Brayer, George Eastman: A Biography (Johns Hopkins 1996) (discussing the
founder of the Eastman Kodak Company and the firm); David A. Hounshell and John
Kenly Smith, Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902-1980 (Cambridge
1988); Leonard S. Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research: Science and Busi-
ness at GE and Bell, 1876-1926 (Cambridge 1985).
' Cases involving ownership of patented inventions arose in both state and federal
courts. Because Congress had placed exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of patents in
the Patent Office and the federal courts, some of the litigation about ownership of inven-
tions occurred in appeals from Patent Office decisions awarding patents or in infringe-
ment suits. In some cases, however, the validity or infringement of a patent was not in is-
sue; the issue was ownership of the patent and the idea it protected. Such cases were re-
garded as matters of contract law or master and servant law, and were litigated in state
court unless the requirements of diversity jurisdiction were met. There was a certain
amount of confusion in the early cases about whether state courts had jurisdiction over suits
alleging, for example, breach of promise to assign patents, because of the federal courts' exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the validity of patents, but most state courts understood that they could
enforce the contracts without inquiry into the validity of the patents. See, for example, Mid-
dlebrook v Broadbent, 47 NY 443,446-48 (1872); Binney v Annan, 107 Mass 94,95 (1871).
See Curtis I §§ 39-43 at 31-37 (cited in note 28); George Ticknor Curtis, A Treatise
on the Law of Patents for Useful Inventions §§ 118-23 at 130-39 (Little, Brown 4th ed
1873) ("Curtis III).
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or ingenuity than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic skilled
in the business ......
Whatever may be the proportion of all inventions that were
devised by one person alone prior to the Industrial Revolution, it
declined as technology grew more complex during the nineteenth
century.0 The notion of the inventor as a genius working alone in
his shop became increasingly anachronistic as the complexity of
technology required numerous machinists, chemists, or other
skilled workers to contribute to the development of ever more so-
phisticated and complicated machines, compounds, and proc-
esses. Collective research and development had become the
source of most inventions long before courts and the public finally
realized it. One of the earliest reported decisions discussing an
organized research laboratory and the collaborative nature of in-
vention as relevant to patent ownership was a 1911 decision in-
volving an improved light bulb invented by employees of General
Electric's research labs.4' As the reality of collective invention
confronted the individualist paradigm of nineteenth century pat-
ent law, the law's choice of which particular individuals to con-
sider the inventors may have been determined as much by inter-
personal or political skill and economic power as by inventive
genius.
The notion that a single person was the inventor of an idea,
and that he owned not only the particular thing he built (for ex-
ample, the cotton gins that Eli Whitney himself made), but also
the idea embodied in that thing (and thus had an exclusive right
Teese v Phelps, 23 F Cases 832, 834 (Cir CtN D Cal 1855). See also Alden v Dewey, 1
F Cases 329, 330 (Cir Ct D Mass 1840) (opinion by Story) (explaining that in determining
who was the inventor, "[t was not enough, that Draper gave a hint; nor, on the other
hand, was it necessary, that he should communicate every minute thing about the inven-
tion; but he must have communicated the substance"). In an influential English case of
the era, two judges spoke of the need to protect employer-inventors from the risk that the
men they employed would wrongfully claim to be the inventors. See Allen v Rawson, 1 CB
551, 135 Eng Rep 656 (CP 1845). One judge said, "It would be very dangerous to employ
any workman in matters of this sort, if the inventor were precluded from adopting any
slight and subordinate improvement suggested by him." 135 Eng Rep at 665. The other
said, "I think it is too much that a suggestion of a workman, employed in the course of the
experiments, of something calculated more easily to carry into effect the conceptions of the
inventor, should render the whole patent void." Id at 666.
"See, for example, Khan and Sokoloff, 53 J Econ Hist at 295-301 (1993) (cited in note
32) (noting that early nineteenth century inventors were generalists who lacked special-
ized training); Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
(cited in note 36) (discussing impact on individual inventors of increasingly complex tech-
nology).
" See Ladoff v Dempster, 36 DC App 520, 523 (1911). Ironically, for all the court's at-
tention in that case to the size and sophistication of the lab, id, the court held that the
former employee, not GE, was entitled to the patent because GE's chemists initially dis-
missed the employee's idea and GE refused to apply for a patent on it. Id at 525-26, 530.
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to make any similar thing), was a conception of property in ideas,
an attribution of causation, and an individuation of what is nec-
essarily a social process. That notion of individual inventorship
and of property in ideas developed over the course of several cen-
turies. By the nineteenth century, however, it was so widely ac-
cepted as to seem a matter of natural right.42 The legal and philo-
sophical roots of the individual inventor's right, to exclusive do-
minion over his ideas were deep and strong by the time courts
began to combine the law of patents with the law of master and
servant in the late nineteenth century.
B. The Origin and Development of the Shop Right Doctrine as a
License Based on Consent or Estoppel
The earliest reported opinions on the rights of employers in
their employees' inventions involved infringement disputes be-
tween the employer and third parties. In these cases the third
party defended against the alleged infringement by asserting that
the employer's claim to the patent was invalid because the em-
ployer's workman was the real inventor. Judging from the opin-
ions' recitations of the facts, this defense was conjured up by in-
fingers searching for any conceivable basis for challenging the
patents' validity. In these circumstances, the infringers could not
have known at the time of the infringement that the patentee-
employer was not the actual inventor. Not surprisingly, the
courts rejected this post-hoc excuse for infringement. To do so,
they readily accepted the employer's characterization of the em-
ployee as just a workman who simply executed the instructions
the employer gave.4" In these early cases, the employment rela-
42 See Federalist 43 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 271-72
(Mentor 1961) ("The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to
be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to be-
long to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of indi-
viduals."). Finally, when searching for the roots of the nineteenth century law's insistence
on the rights of the individual inventor, one ought not overlook that the right of the inven-
tor to own his "discoveries" was enshrined in the Constitution. The Constitution spoke in
explicitly instrumental terms. The clause according Congress the power to enact patent
and copyright laws claimed "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries... " US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8.
' See Dixon v Moyer, 7 F Cases 758, 759 (Cir Ct D Pa 1821); Sparkman v Higgins, 22
F Cases 878, 879 (Cir Ct S D NY 1846); Dental Vulcanite Co v Wetherbee, 7 F Cases 498,
502-03 (Cir Ct D Mass 1866). Later cases reached the same result. See Matthews &
Willard Lamp Co v Trenton Manufacturing Co, 73 F 212, 215-16 (Cir Ct D NJ 1896).
Not every case rejected the defense, however. In an 1888 infringement action, the
court determined the patent invalid because the employer's idea-to imitate in print fabric
the crinkly texture of the seersucker weave-was not novel; the court suggested that the
novelty lay in the employee's print design. See Streat v White, 35 F 426, 427-28 (Cir Ct S D
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tionship as a legal structure was all but irrelevant. The employer
successfully claimed the invention because the idea was his own,
not because he was the employer. Nevertheless, these few cases
sowed the seeds for later developments: an early patent treatise
author deduced from them a general rule that "the person who
suggests the principle of the invention is the inventor," whether
master or servant." In only one of these cases did the court con-
front an employer's claim that he owned the product of the em-
ployee's creative mind (as opposed to the products of his hands).
And in none of them did the court address a dispute between an
employer and employee over an idea they both claimed.
The first published opinion resolving a dispute between an
employer and an employee over their rights to the employee's in-
vention was the Supreme Court's 1843 decision in McClurg v
Kingsland.45 The Court held that, because the employee had
freely allowed the employer to use his invention (which he had
developed at work) before patenting it, the employer had a license
to use the invention.46
NY 1888).
" Curtis I § 49 at 42-43 (cited in note 28). In support of this, Curtis cited a number of
English cases, including Minter v Wells and Hart, 1 Webs Pat Cases 127, 132 (NP 1834)
(holding that person originating the idea is inventor, and not treating employment as de-
terminative of ownership); Rex v Arkwright, 1 Webs Pat Cases 64, 72 (1785) (holding that
the employer was not the inventor, because he obtained the idea from his workmen);
Barker and Harris v Shaw, 1 Webs Pat Cases 126 (no date) ("But if a person be employed
to perfect the details of or carry out into execution the original idea of the patentee, that
which he suggests or invents while so employed, and subsidiary to such idea, is in law the
invention of the patentee."). Curtis also cited cases holding that, so long as the employer
conceived of the idea, the employer was the inventor even if the employee used his skill to
make the item. Curtis I § 49 at 43, citing Bloxam v Else, 1 Carp Pat Cases 432, 436-37 (KB
1825), and Makepeace v Jackson, 4 Taunt 770 (CP 1814). In none of these cases (except
Makepeace) did the court really analyze the rights of the employer in the employee's in-
ventions. Neither Godsons 1823 treatise on English patent law, nor Phillips's 1837 trea-
tise on American patent law, dealt with the rights of employer and employee. Richard
Godson, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Patents for Inventions and of Copyright (Wil-
liam Benning 2d ed 1844); Phillips, The Law of Patents for Inventions (cited in note 33).
Hindmarch was the first patent treatise writer to mention the problem of master and ser-
vant. He said: 'Our law... permits an inventor in the prosecution of his discovery to avail
himself of the labour of servants, they being considered as mere tools or instruments
working by his directions, and carrying out the views which he has formed in his own
mind." W.M. Hindmarch, A Treatise on the Law Relative to Patent Privileges for the Sole
Use of Inventions and the Practice of Obtaining Letters Patents for Inventions 26 (McKin-
ley and Lescure 1847).
42 US (1 How) 202 (1843). The dispute was between the employer and the em-
ployee's assignee, not the employee himself. Id at 206. But because the employee's as-
signee stood in the shoes of the employee, id, and because the invention's value to employ-
ees often depends on their ability to validly assign the invention to a third party, the dis-
pute may be regarded for these purposes as being between employer and employee.
"Id at 207-08.
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The license right that McClurg created did not rest on the
employment relationship. Rather, it rested on the notion that an
inventor (who happened to be an employee) who allowed someone
(who happened to be the employer) to use the invention for a pe-
riod of years could not later, upon patenting the invention, sue
that user for infringement. This rule was simply an application of
the established equity doctrine of estoppel 4 7 one who knowingly
allows or encourages certain conduct cannot later object to it; his
earlier forbearance "estops" him from complaining. The em-
ployer's license was based on the employee's consent. Every case
from 1843 to 1886 that granted a license to an employer to use an
employee's invention did so on the basis of this estoppel ration-
ale.
McClurg is important not only because it established a new
rule, but also because it reveals how courts viewed the employer's
position vis-h-vis the employee's invention. James Harley, while
employed by the week in the defendant's foundry in Pittsburgh,
invented an improved way of casting iron rollers and other me-
tallic cylinders. Harley made a number of experiments during his
work at the defendant's foundry. When his invention proved suc-
cessful, his employer began to use his method and consequently
increased Harley's wages.49 Harley suggested that his employer
take out a patent on it and purchase his right, but the employer
refused. Harley then went to work for the plaintiffs." When he
obtained a patent for the invention, Harley assigned the patent to
his new employers, who then sued Harley's former employer for
infringement.5' The circuit court charged the jury that these facts
would justify finding that the employee had made "a license, a
special privilege, or grant" to the former employer.52 In affirming
the jury's verdict for the defendant, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that Harley made the invention while in the defendant's
employ and allowed him to use it without demanding compensa-
tion. The Court went so far as to say that it would have been a
"fair construction" of the Patent Act if the circuit court had
charged the jury that the patent was void because Harley had
" McClurg was not a case in equity; it was a suit before a jury seeking damages for an
infringement. Id at 205-06. Nevertheless, the rule the Court employed resembled the equi-
table doctrine ofestoppel. Id at 207-08.
Or at least every case found while researching this Article. See notes 70-76.
"42 US (1 How) at 204-05.
0Id at 205.
51 Id.
'Id.
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allowed his invention to be used before having applied for the
patent.5
The Court cited three cases in support of its conclusion that
the employer had a license: Pennock v Dialogue,. Grant v Rich-
mond,55 and Shaw v Cooper.5" None involved employment. All
three concerned the question whether an inventor who sells or
allows use of his invention prior to seeking a patent can thereaf-
ter obtain a patent. Pennock was an infringement suit in which
the Court found no infringement because the inventor sold the
hose incorporating his invention to the public before he sought a
patent; the public sale invalidated the subsequent patent applica-
tion.5' Grant was similar. The Court found an infringement only
because the inventor had acquired a patent (albeit an invalid one)
prior to allowing the public use. The public use therefore did not
void the later valid patent.58 The Shaw Court found no infringe-
ment on a variation of Pennock's public use rule: the inventor had
not intended to allow the public to use the patented invention in
America, but he had acquiesced in the public use by failing to ap-
ply for a patent promptly upon coming to the United States. In
this case, the invention had been used in England and to a lesser
extent in the United States before the patent was issued.59
The facts, reasoning, and holding of McClurg thus indicate
that the employer acquired the license because Harley had con-
sented to its use, not because of the employment relationship.
McClurg was nothing more than a variation on Pennock; both
cases barred an inventor from obtaining a patent monopoly after
he freely allowed others to use it. Indeed, that is the "public use"
principle for which McClurg was and sometimes continues to be
cited;'o it is a rule that Congress wrote into the Patent Act first in
Id at 208.
27 US (2 Pet) 1 (1829).
31 US (6 Pet) 218 (1832).
32 US (7 Pet) 292 (1833).
27 US (2 Pet) at 23-24 (explaining "that the first inventor cannot acquire a good title
to a patent; if he suffers the thing invented to go into public use, or to be publicly sold for
use, before he makes application for a patent").
31 US (6 Pet) at 243-44.
32 US (7 Pet) at 322-23, citing Pennock.
Among the cases citing McClurg as establishing a rule that one who allows others to
use his invention cannot later sue for infringement are Lane & Bodley Co v Locke, 150 US
193, 198-200 (1893) (relying on McClurg to hold that an employee's right to royalties for
use of invention was lost through laches because of his failure to request payment);
Woodmanse & Hewitt Manufacturing Co v Williams, 68 F 489, 492 (6th Cir 1895) (holding
that patent owner who allowed use of invention for fourteen years was barred by equity
from enjoining infringement); Chabot v American Button-Hole & Overseaming Co, 5 F
Cases 389, 389-90 (Cir Ct E D Pa 1872) (awarding employer a right to use based on
McClurg rule).
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1836 and subsequently revised.6' The license by "public use" ap-
plied in McClurg was not an employment rule either before 1843
or after. Inventors who allowed others to use their invention be-
fore patenting it were held to have granted a license or to have
invalidated the patent, unless the user was simply testing it at
the request of the inventor.
2
Then as now, the reason for the public use and the shop right
rules was fairness, but the conception of "fairness" differed be-
tween them. In McClurg, Harley allowed his employer to use the
invention, and the Court thought it unfair that he should later
take back (or charge for) what he had freely given." In Pennock,
because the patentees had sold their patented hose to the public
before obtaining a patent, the Court denied the validity of the
patent. Justice Story explained:
If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the
knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he
should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and
make, and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the
whole profits of it, relying upon his superior skill and knowl-
edge of the structure; and then, and then only, when the
danger of competition should force him to secure the exclu-
sive right, he should be allowed to take out a patent, and
thus exclude the public from any farther use than what
SI The Patent Act of 1793, § 1, allowed a patent only if the invention was "not known
or used before the application .... " 1 Stat 318, 319. In Pennock, Justice Story construed
that language to invalidate a patent only if the invention was known or used by the public
(as opposed to the inventor or his assistants) before the date of the application. 27 US (2
Pet) at 19. Section 7 of the Patent Act of 1836 codified the Court's holding in Pennock so as
to halt the problem of patenting inventions that had been in public use. Patent Act of
1836, § 7, 5 Stat 117, 119-20. Congress altered this provision of the 1836 Act when it
amended the Patent Act in 1839. Section 7 of the 1839 Act, which the Court construed in
McClurg, allowed anyone who acquired the patented device less than two years prior to
the application for a patent "the right to use, and vend to others to be used, the specific
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter so made or purchased, without liability
therefor to the inventor. . . except on proof of abandonment of such invention to the public
."Patent Act of 1839, § 7, 5 Stat 353, 354.
The history and current treatment of the public use provision are detailed in Wil-
liam C. Rooklidge and Stephen C. Jensen, Common Sense, Simplicity and Experimental
Use Negation of the Public Use and On Sale Bars to Patentability, 29 John Marshall L Rev
1, 8-21 (1995); F. Andrew Ubel, Who's on First: The Trade Secret Prior User or a Subse-
quent Patentee, 76 J Pat & Trademark Off Society 401, 407-417 (1994). See generally Ear-
nest Bainbridge Lipscomb III, 2 Walker on Patents § 7:24 at 459-66 (Lawyer's Co-Op
1985).
"On this final exception, see note 65. See also Lipscomb, 1 Walker on Patents § 4:14
at 310-11 (cited in note 61) ("The use of the invention by or under the control of the inven-
tor for no longer period than reasonably necessary to determine by experiment whether
the invention is complete will not invalidate the patent.. .
42 US (1 How) at 207-08.
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should be derived under it during his fourteen years; it
would materially retard the progress of science and the use-
ful arts, and give a premium to those who should be least
prompt to communicate their discoveries.'
The rationale was based on the public interest rather than
individual fairness. An inventor could not first allow public use in
order to create a market for the invention, and then seek a patent
monopoly to guarantee a high price.' Thus, McClurg was a novel
interpretation of the public use provision of the 1839 Patent Act
and a variation on the equitable principle of estoppel. McClurg
did not analyze how employment affected an inventor's right to
own his invention."
But the reporter of the McClurg case did. The headnote sug-
gested that the employer's license was based on facts that the
Court's opinion had not emphasized. The headnote read:
If a person employed in the manufactory of another, while
receiving wages, makes experiments at the expense and in
the manufactory of his employer; has his wages increased in
consequence of the useful result of the experiments; makes
the article invented and permits his employer to use it, no
compensation for its use being paid or demanded; and then
obtains a patent, these facts will justify the presumption of a
license to use the invention.67
Although the headnote emphasized that Harley devised the in-
vention on the job and also received a raise on account of the in-
vention, the Courtes reasoning did not. In the Court's opinion, the
status and compensation of the employee were irrelevant. The
employer was just like any member of the public whom Harley
had allowed to use the invention; neither Harley nor his assigns
could claim infringement by his former employer or demand com-
27 US (2 Pet) at 19.
"See James A. Jorgensen, Comment, Environmentally Dependent Inventions and the
"On Sale" and "Public Use" Bars of § 102(b): A Proffered Solution to a Statutory Dichot-
omy, 49 U Miami L Rev 185, 201 (1994) (explaining that the patent court "rarely extends
the doctrine for the benefit of inventors, typically finding some commercial motivation" for
allowing use) (citation omitted); Jay David Schainholz, Note, The Validity of Patents After
Market Testing: A New and Improved Experimental Use Doctrine?, 85 Colum L Rev 371,
390 (1985) (explaining that market testing to stimulate demand should bar a subsequent
patent application).
"It is also worthy of note that the employer in McClurg did not claim ownership of
the patent; rather, he claimed that the patent was invalid. 42 US (1 How) at 205-06.
McClurg was thus a partial victory for the employee because the court might have con-
cluded that the patent was invalid. In later cases, employers were more ambitious, usually
claiming ownership of the patent.
Id at 202.
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pensation from it after obtaining the patent." Yet the rule as ar-
ticulated in the headnote ultimately became as influential as the
Court's opinion itself.69
For forty years after McClurg, lower courts followed the
Court's estoppel rationale rather than the employment rule in the
headnote. The first case after McClurg that involved an em-
ployer's license to use an employee's invention7' illustrates the
Id at 208-09.
The headnote was very likely written by Benjamin Howard, who at that time was in
his first year as the Reporter for the Supreme Courtes opinions. See 42 US (1 How) iv
(1843) (noting Howard's appointment as the Court's reporter on August 26, 1842, and his
swearing in on February 1, 1843). Readers of today's Supreme Court opinions are probably
familiar with the admonition at the beginning of the syllabus, which states that '[t~he
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Re-
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader," citing United States v Detroit Tim-
ber & Lumber Co, 200 US 321, 337 (1906) (establishing this rule in a case where a head-
note was wrong).
The early court reporters' duties "were to summarize the facts, prepare the headnotes,
summarize the arguments of counsel," and arrange for publication. Surrency, History of
American Law Publishing at 43 (cited in note 33). See also William Domnarski, In the
Opinion of the Court 6-11, 16-18 (Illinois 1996). Then as now, in the Supreme Court as in
lower courts, the reporter of court decisions, not the Court, decided what to put in head-
notes, although the Court may have reviewed the headnotes as well as the text of the
opinion as reported. Yet it remains significant that the headnote in McClurg emphasized
the license arising from the employment rather than from the employee's consent because
the Court's opinion emphasized the latter over the former.
7' The first shop right case after McClurg was Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa 155 (1868). It
did not involve an employer and employee, but instead was an internecine struggle among
the partners in a family business. Henry Slemmer, a partner in an oil drilling and refining
partnership, developed and patented an improved petroleum refining process. The other
partners sued to require him to assign the patent to them jointly as partners and to force
him to share the profits from the patent. Id at 161-63. The court declined to require as-
signment of the patent because it found that Henry was the inventor. Id at 166. It held,
however, that under McClurg Henry was obliged to give his former partners a license to
use the invention. Although the opinion paraphrased the language of the headnote to the
effect that a person employed who invents something at the expense of the employer must
grant a license to the employer, id at 167, the facts suggested the license rested on the es-
toppel rationale of McClurg: Henry allowed the partnership to use his patented process
before obtaining the patent, and indeed did not dispute that the partnership was entitled
to a license for so long as the partnership lasted. (The dispute was whether the license
would survive the partnership; the court said it did.) Id at 162-63, 167. The shop right was
not limited to employers, but also applied among partners in a partnership. Id at 166-67.
Two early cases citing McClurg, decided in 1883 and 18§4, both found the license to
exist in the context of a partnership. Thus, where one partner had made inventions using
partnership property, the partnership or remaining partners retained licenses to use the
invention upon dissolution of the partnership. See Wade v Metcalf, 16 F 130, 132 (Cir Ct D
Mass 1883), affd, 129 US 202, 206 (1889) (holding that after partnership dissolved, one
partner could not sue others for patent infringement, because all the partners had a right
to continue to use the machines built at the firm's expense); Keller v Stolzenbach, 20 F 47,
49 (Cir Ct W D Pa 1884) (holding that when a partnership dissolved, each partner could
use existing sand and gravel separators, but noninventing partner could not make addi-
tional ones). Another case, not citing McClurg, also found a license in the partnership con-
text. See Montross v Mabie, 30 F 234, 235-36 (Cir Ct S D NY 1887).
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tendency of courts to emphasize employee consent as the basis for
the employer's license. The case, Chabot v American Button-Hole
& Overseaming Co,7 plainly relied on the estoppel aspect of
McClurg. The inventor (plaintiff) was employed by the defendant
as a foreman under a written contract to make five thousand
sewing machines containing the defendant's patented devices.
While doing so, the plaintiff devised a patentable process for
building the machines. The contract specified that any machinery
or tools used to make the sewing machines would become the em-
ployer's property at a price to be determined later. The court con-
cluded that the inventor had consented to the defendants use of
his process for making sewing machines and that the written con-
tract allowing the use made an even stronger case than McClurg
for granting a license.72
Every decision from 1843 to 1886 that granted an employer a
license to use an employee invention did so on the basis of facts
like those in Chabot, where the employee had permitted or even
encouraged his employer to manufacture or use his invention
during his employment. To be sure, not every case cited
McClurg," and of those that did, some quoted its headnote. Nev-
n 5 F Cases 389 (Cir Ct E D Pa 1872).
Id at 389-90. Wilkens v Spafford, 29 F Cases 1242 (Cir Ct D Mass 1878), likewise
involved an explicit written agreement in which the inventor gave "the exclusive benefit"
of his invention to the employer. The court held that the contract gave the employer an ex-
clusive-use license. Id at 1243-44.
" Whiting v Graves, 29 F Cases 1059 (Cir Ct D Mass 1878) was the first reported shop
right decision that did not cite McClurg. But like the others, the opinion rested the em-
ployer's license on estoppel. The employer sued the defendants for infringement of the
patent to a former employee's invention. The defendants claimed the employee had as-
signed them the employee's interest in the invention. The employer responded that the
employee had no interest to assign because the employer had hired him specifically to in-
vent. Id at 1060. The court concluded that the employee-inventor retained an equitable
one-half interest in the invention, and that the inventor was hired to make improvements
in machines to be used in the employer's factory only, not to be sold to others. "The em-
ployment to invent and perfect machinery for that purpose, while it would operate as a li-
cense to Whiting to use machines invented by Howard, and put in use under such em-
ployment, would not, of itself, confer upon Whiting any legal title to the invention itself, or
to letters patent protecting it." Id. Because the employee retained an interest in the inven-
tion, he validly assigned it to the defendants and they therefore did not infringe the patent
by manufacturing machines patented. Id at 1061.
Similarly, the 1882 decision of Damon & Bihn v Eastwick, 14 F 40 (Cir Ct E D Pa
1882), rested on an estoppel notion even though it did not cite McClurg. A company di-
rected two chemists employed by the firm to develop an improved process for making alu-
minous cake. One of the chemists solved the problem and, with the approval of the firm,
obtained a patent, which he then refused to assign to the company. The company sued,
alleging that the chemist was not the inventor. Upon determining that he was, the court
dismissed the suit. The court declined to rule upon "[tihe justice or injustice of the respon-
dent's taxing the salt company, if he proposes to do so, for the use of a process disclosed by
experiments made at its request and expense, with its material, while in its employment."
Id at 42. The court simply concluded that the employee as the inventor owned the patent
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ertheless, all adhered to the estoppel basis for the shop right.74
In retrospect, McClurg could be read simply as a statutory
interpretation opinion, construing Section 7 of the Patent Act of
1839 to prohibit the issuance of a patent from depriving a prior
user of the right to use the invention. Alternatively, McClurg
could be read as a case about licenses arising by consent or estop-
pel, determining that one who has allowed another to use his in-
vention is estopped from suing for infringement later. Whatever
the original rationale, however, McClurg became the fountain-
head of another branch of law that ceased immediately to have
anything to do with the statutory section on which the Court re-
lied and ceased before long to have much to "do with consent or es-
toppel. After McClurg, courts almost never relied on the prior
public use provision of the statute to allocate rights between em-
ployer and employee.75 Four decades after McClurg, the estoppel
notion was supplanted by the notion that employers are entitled
to a license to their employee inventions, regardless of actual em-
ployee consent, because of the resources the employer has con-
tributed. This license came to be known as a "shop right."76
and the employer had no right to use it. In another similar case (that did not mention
McClurg), the court, upon showing that the employee had supervised and permitted the
employer to manufacture his invention (a "Daisy Hood" for a stove) during his employ-
ment, concluded that the employer continued to have a license to manufacture Daisy
Hoods after the employee left to set up his own firm to manufacture them. Herman v
Herman, 29 F 92, 94 (Cir Ct S D NY 1886).
7' The McClurg doctrine was not mentioned in employment law treatises for forty
years after McClurg was decided. Even the second edition of Wood's influential Treatise on
the Law of Master and Servant in 1886 dealt with the ownership of employee inventions
only in a couple of sentences. Wood put employee inventions in the category of the mas-
ter's entitlement to the servanes earnings. He said, "For the encouragement of improve-
ments in machinery, etc., it is held that if a servant makes an improvement in machinery,
or invents a machine, the master is not entitled to the patent as against the servant, un-
less the servant was hired for that purpose." Wood H § 101 at 200 (cited in note 31). See
also id § 50 at 76 ("[An apprentice or servant who invents a machine during the period of
his apprenticeship or service is entitled to the patent thereon, but, in the case of a servant,
the rule is different, if he was employed for the express purpose of inventing."). Wood cited
Hill v Thompson, 8 Taunt 375 (CP 1818), and Bloxam, 1 Carp Pat Cases 568, but in nei-
ther did the employment relationship play into the court's analysis. See note 44. Wood
also cited Green v Willard Improved Barrel Co, 1 Mo App 202 (1876), which was a wrong-
ful discharge proceeding and is discussed in note 205, and Joliet Manufacturing Co v Dice,
105 Ill 649 (1883), which involved an express contract. See text accompanying notes 246-
50.
"' In Dable Grain Shovel Co v Flint, 137 US 41, 42-43 (1890), the Court relied on the
public use provision to hold that the former employer of an inventor could use his patented
inventions without paying a royalty to the patent assignee because the inventor had con-
structed and installed them in the employer's facility prior to applying for the patents.
This is the only employment case that relied on Section 7; it did not cite McClurg.
' The origin of the term "shop right" remains a mystery. It must have been a popular
term of art because when it first appeared in a published opinion in 1887, the court used it
as if the term were already a common usage. See Annin v Wren, 44 Hun 352, 356 (NY S Ct
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C. The Development of the Shop Right as an Employment Rule
In the mid-1880s, courts changed their reasoning. They be-
gan to award employers a license to use employee inventions be-
cause the employee had devised the invention on the job, rather
than because the employee had allowed the employer to use the
invention. The transition was subtle. In cases that emphasized
estoppel, the courts pointed out that the employee had allowed
the employer to use the invention by installing it in the em-
ployer's plant or encouraging the employer to manufacture it. In
cases that emphasized employment, the courts relied principally
on the factors that had been noted in the McClurg headnote: that
the employer supported the development of the invention by
paying the employee's wages and allowing the inventor to use the
employer's plant to perfect the invention. In both types of cases,
however, the employee appeared to have devised the invention on
the job using the employer's materials. The circumstances of the
inventing did not change, but which facts the courts emphasized
did. The courts began to focus less on the employee's conduct in
allowing use of the invention and more on the employer's conduct
in supporting the development of the invention. The rationale for
the license began as a fairness notion based on the employee's
free choice; it became an entitlement notion based on the em-
ployer's ownership of the raw materials and labor used in devel-
oping the invention.
A pair of 1886 federal circuit court decisions in New Hamp-
shire and Massachusetts were the first to ignore the estoppel ra-
tionale. In the Massachusetts case, the court awarded a license to
the employer simply because its employee built a machine on the
job using the invention." The- New Hampshire case even more
clearly rejected the estoppel notion. While employed as an over-
seer in the defendant's mill, the plaintiff installed a number of his
own patented devices in the mill's machinery. ' The company's
witnesses claimed that the plaintiff allowed the company free use
of his inventions in order to test and obtain publicity for them.7"
The inventor testified that he allowed the use only because the
company officials told him that his status as employee gave them
a right to use his inventions without compensation. (The officials
did not deny having said this.) He also argued that when he pro-
1887).
,' American Tube-Works v Bridgewater Iron Co, 26 F 334, 335-36 (Cir Ct D Mass
1886).
Jencks v Langdon Mills, 27 F 622, 622 (Cir Ct D NH 1886).
Id at 623.
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tested, they agreed to pay him $250 per year. The company
claimed that the payment was a raise; the plaintiff claimed that
it was a license fee for as long as the company used the patents.
The court concluded that, where an employee's invention was in-
stalled in the employer's factory, "a license from the patentee was
to be presumed.'
Both of these cases could have been decided on the estoppel
rationale. In both, the employee appeared to allow the employer
to use the device by incorporating it in machines in the em-
ployer's factory. It would be irrelevant to the estoppel rationale
that the employee in both cases patented the invention before al-
lowing its use (unlike in McClurg and Pennock)-the license in
such a case would then just be based on consent, and estoppel
would limit the employee's ability to revoke the license if there
were reliance. The courts might have emphasized the unfairness
of permitting an employee to claim the employer had no license to
use the invention, after having allowed the employer to change
the fixtures or machines in its plant in reliance on the employee's
invention. And, indeed, some fairness overtones appear in the
courts' opinions."' But both courts' opinions emphasized the em-
ployers' entitlement to use that which was developed in their fac-
tories, with their materials, and on their work time. The estoppel
rationale would have been unpersuasive in the New Hampshire
case in any event given the employee's assertion that he installed
the device only because the employer claimed a right to use it. 2
Some cases during the 1880s and 1890s refused to choose be-
tween the rationales, emphasizing both that the employer had
contributed time and material and that the employee had allowed
or encouraged the employer to use the invention. For example,
this dual emphasis was apparent in Hapgood v Hewitt,m the Su-
preme Court's first post-McClurg patent case involving an em-
ployment relationship. The Court deemed significant both that
the employer financed the development of the invention and that
the employee permitted the employer to manufacture it.'
The suit was brought in equity and sought to force Hewitt,
the inventor, to assign patents for an iron plow to a corporation
"Id at 624. This was dictum, as the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because there was no diversity of citizenship between the parties. Id.
81 American Tube-Works, 26 F at 335; Jencks, 27 F at 623-24.
Jencks, 27 F at 623-24. The court did, however, suggest that the evidence favored
the employer's version of the reason why the employee installed the devices, which might
have supported a license based on estoppel. Id.
"119 US 226 (1886).
"Id at 230-31.
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that was the successor in interest to the corporation that had em-
ployed him. Hewitt had gone to work for Hapgood & Company in
1873 as the superintendent of the manufacturing department. In
1876, Hewitt and the company president agreed that the firm
should make an iron riding plow; the Court described how Hewitt
set about to do it:
During all the time that he was engaged in devising and con-
structing the new plow he was in the employ of the corpora-
tion, and drawing a salary of $3,000 a year. The time during
which he was so engaged was the regular working hours in
the factory. The men who did the manual labor on the new
plow were all employees of and paid by the corporation, and
all the materials used in its construction were bought and
paid for by the corporation.'
Clearly the Court meant to emphasize the importance of the em-
ployer's contribution to the invention. But the Court also empha-
sized that Hewitt allowed his employer to believe that the inven-
tion was the firm's property:
During the time Hewitt remained in its employ he never
made any claim of property in any of the devices and im-
provements made or suggested by him in the new plow, and
never stated or claimed that he was entitled to a patent on
any of said improvements, or that he had any rights adverse
to the corporation in any of said improvements or devices....!6
Thus the Court premised its recognition of the employer's license
on both the estoppel and the employment rationales.
Cases after Hapgood began to base a shop right increasingly
on the employer's support of the invention. In Withington-Cooley
Manufacturing Co v Kinney,7 an 1895 Sixth Circuit decision, the
court inferred a license from the fact that the employee-inventor
had developed a power press on the job and had allowed the em-
ployer to make and sell his improved press for ten years before
suing for infringement.' Even more emphatically, an 1897 Sec-
Id at 230.
Id at 231.
68 F 500 (6th Cir 1895).
Id at 505. The court concluded that the ten year delay in filing suit and the fact that
the invention was developed on the job, rather than simply a failure to protest, were the
bases for granting a license. Id. An Ohio district court decision observed (in dicta, because
it found the patent invalid for lack of novelty) that an employer would have a license to
use a method of applying color to pottery because the inventor had developed the method
while she was working at the pottery firm and an officer of the firm was the one who sug-
gested-two years later-that she seek the patent and assign it to the firm. Fry v Rock-
wood Pottery Co, 90 F 494, 499-500 (Cir Ct S D Ohio 1898).
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ond Circuit decision found the employer had a shop right in the
machines for seaming sheet metal tubes because the inventor
was "a workman in the employ of another," who "manufacture[d]
for him, in his shop, and with his materials, and uppn weekly
wages, machines which the employer use[d] as a part of his tools,
without knowledge of any objection thereto." 9 The court thought
it inappropriate that an employee should "seek[ ] to restrain the
employer from the use of the particular machine or machines
which had been thus made in the employer's shop under the su-
pervision of the employ6, and apparently as a part of his ordinary
mechanical work." ° Although the court claimed that the license
was an "outgrowth of the law of estoppel in pais,"9' the estoppel
notion was hardly part of the story, given that the employee had
demanded a royalty as soon as the machines were constructed.
Indeed, the employee was fired two days after requesting either
that the employer pay a royalty or cease using the invention.92
A pair of Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinions from 1896
and 1898 forcefully articulated the idea that the license arose
from the employer's investment rather than from the employee's
express or implicit consent.9" The cases resolved a dispute over
ownership of recipes for carpet yarn dyes and of samples of dyed
yarn. The employee claimed that the books containing his for-
mulas and yarn samples were his property. The employer claimed
that they belonged to the mill, and when the employee attempted
to depart with the books, the company forcibly stopped him. The
mill kept the books, and the dyer sued for them, claiming that
they and the recipes they contained were his property. (Indeed,
the dyer had concocted many of the recipes in the books before
emigrating to the United States and brought them with him
when he began work at the mill.)"
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued two opinions in the
case, both for the employer. In the first, the court held that the
employee might keep copies of his recipes, but that the original
recipe books and yarn sample books were the property of the em-
Blauvelt v Interior Conduit & Insulation Co, 80 F 906, 908 (2d Cir 1897).
Id.
91 Id at 909.
Id at 907-08. A similar case emphasized both the employer's contribution to the in-
vention and estoppel based on the fact that the employer had redesigned its buildings in
order to accommodate the employee's machines. See Barber v National Carbon Co, 129 F
370, 373-75 (6th Cir 1904).
"Dempsey v Dobson, 174 Pa 122, 34 A 459 (1896) ("Dempsey 1"); Dempsey v Dobson,
184 Pa 588, 39 A 493 (1898) ("Dempsey 11').
The story of the case is told in Philip Scranton, Figured Tapestry: Production, Mar-
kets, and Power in Philadelphia Textiles, 1885-1941 200-04 (Cambridge 1989).
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ployer. 5 The court reasoned that the employer purchased,
through wages, the product of the employee's skill:
The designer and the color mixer, like the printer and the
weaver, are employed, and their wages adjusted, with refer-
ence to their skill and experience in the department of work
to which they are assigned. They are not independent con-
tractors, producing designs or shades of color by a secret pro-
cess of their own, which they sell, as patterns or colors, to
the manufacturer, for a fixed price; but they are employ6s,
bringing their skill and experience, in the use of the materi-
als furnished by their employer, into his service, for his bene-
fit in the production of his goods.96
On remand for a new trial, the employee offered evidence to prove
that the custom in the industry was that the carpet mixer's reci-
pes and sample books belong exclusively to the employee. The
trial court excluded the evidence.98 On appeal, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of this evidence on the
ground that the custom was "unreasonable" and was contrary to
the law of the shop right.' The court flatly refused to accept the
possibility that, as a matter of trade custom, employees would
own the fruits of their creative skill when the employer had hired
them to exercise that skill:
It is one of the requisites of a good custom that it must be
reasonable. Another is that it must not be contrary to law.
The custom sought to be set up was an unreasonable one.
The color mixer, like the designer and weaver, is employed
because of his supposed ability to serve his employer in the
particular line of labor which he is expected to follow....
The employer has an equal right to the faithful service of
each, and is equally, so far as his own business is concerned,
entitled to the results of the labor of each. If a color mixer
could at his pleasure carry off the recipes and color books
from his employer's factory, and refuse to permit their fur-
ther use except upon his own terms, it would be in his power
to inflict enormous loss on the manufacturer at any moment,
and not merely to disturb, but to destroy, his business. Such
a custom would not be reasonable, and could not be sus-
tained. But it is against the law.... "Even if his employ6
Dempsey I, 174 Pa at 130-31.
Id at 130.
Dempsey II, 184 Pa at 593.
Id.
Id.
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had obtained letters patent for his formula, protecting him-
self thereby against the public, still the employer's right to
continue its use in his own business would be protected by
the United States courts.""°4
The court relied entirely on the argument that the employee had
developed the recipes and color samples while employed and re-
ceiving wages. The employer was entitled to "the faithful service"
of his employee and, therefore, to "the results of the labor" for
which he had paid.'0 '
By rejecting as "unreasonable" the parties' own allocation of
rights in the employee's ideas, the court made the shop right
arise from the mere fact of the employment relationship. No
longer was it an equitable rule to protect the employer, nor even
an effort to enforce some implicit understanding between the par-
ties. Rather, the employer was entitled to the employee's ideas
because he had bought and paid for the employee's time, effort,
and ingenuity.0
2
The demise of the estoppel notion of the shop right occasion-
ally-but rarely-worked to the employee's advantage. An 1896
Indiana decision denied a railroad shop rights in several of its
master mechanic's inventions (a spark arrester, a locomotive
driver brake, an air brake, and a box lid for car wheels).' The
mechanic had developed them without using the employer's time,
materials, or workers. He had, however, installed the devices on
the railroad's trains. Although he testified that he had installed
the devices because his supervisor had instructed him to, he also
admitted that he had not asked for compensation until he was
discharged from his employment. Noting that the railroad had
contributed nothing to inventing or patenting the devices, the
court determined that the fact that the employee had put them on
the trains did not determine whether a license existed.0 4
'"Id, quotingDempsey I, 174 Pa at 130.
"' Dempsey II, 184 Pa at 593. This decision followed an English decision that held that
a calico printer was entitled, after firing his dyer, to the book in which the dyer recorded
the processes for mixing colors, even though many of the processes were the dyer's own in-
vention. Makepeace, 4 Taunt at 770. See also Curtis I § 49 at 71 n 1 (cited in note 28).
"Perhaps one should be cautious in relying heavily on the Dempsey opinions to illus-
trate the trend in ownership of inventions, for the court noted that they did not involve
patented inventions, but rather knowledge more akin to trade secrets. Dempsey I, 174 Pa
at 130. Nevertheless, the court did cite a shop right case as authority and approached the
issue under the rubric of shop right, not the rather separate law of trade secrets. Id. But,
because there was no patent involved, this case was an easier one for the employer than
had a patent been at issue.
Ft Wayne, C & L R Co v Haberkorn, 15 Ind App 479, 44 NE 322, 324-25 (1896).
" 44 NE at 323-24.
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The court emphasized that although the employee had per-
mitted the railroad to use the devices, this fact alone did not es-
tablish that he had done so voluntarily:
If appellant had run out of coal, and, knowing appellee had
plenty of coal, had ordered him to haul down 1,000 bushels
for use in the shops, and he had done so, no one would claim
that appellant should not pay therefor because he was its
master mechanic, and the coal was necessary to the proper
carrying on of his department, even though nothing was said
about pay. The same principle is more or less applicable
here. 0
5
The court declined to award a shop right because "none of the
employer's material or labor entered into the discovery or perfec-
tion of these inventions, nor was anything of the employer's de-
voted to the construction of the appliances until after the inven-
tion had been put into definite form and carried to completion,
and a patent either issued or applied for."1°" Thus, the court
treated the lack of the employer's contribution of materials as
more significant than the question of whether the employee vol-
untarily or reluctantly allowed the employer to use the inven-
tion. 07
"'Id at 324.
"'Id at 325.
'"As the circumstances where the courts would award a shop right expanded, so too
did the rights the employer acquired by virtue of the shop right. The expansion took two
forms. First, courts gradually decided that the employee could not claim royalties or any
compensation under the shop right, and second, courts determined that shop rights might
be transferable under limited circumstances.
The first reported decision on whether the employee-inventor could demand compen-
sation for an implied license was Deane v Hodge, 35 Minn 146, 27 NW 917 (1886). The in-
ventor, a director and officer of a harvester company, allowed the company to use his pat-
ented grain elevator without contracting for additional compensation. The court found
"nothing in the case necessarily inconsistent with his individual or private right to make
such inventions, and secure a patent therefor as his own peculiar property, and to exclude
the use thereof by the company, without his consent, if he elected to do so." 27.NW at 918.
Having so found, and having determined that the plaintiff allowed the firm to use the in-
vention, the court concluded that the plaintiff could recover reasonable compensation for
the value of the license, notwithstanding the absence of any express agreement. Id at 919-
20.
The Supreme Court rejected a claim for additional compensation for a license in Solo-
mons v United States, 137 US 342, 346 (1890). The next Supreme Court case on the shop
right doctrine, Lane & Bodley Co, 150 US at 200-01, rejected an employee's claim to a roy-
alty for the employer's use of his invention. Without deciding whether an employee would
ever be entitled to a royalty, the Court held that the employee was barred by laches from
asserting the claim. Id at 201. The employee had allowed the employer to use the inven-
tion for twelve years without asserting a claim for royalties because he did not want to
disturb his amicable relations with his employer, and possibly jeopardize his continued
employment. "The plaintiff's excuse in this instance, that he preferred for prudential rea-
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Between 1843 and roughly 1900, the employer's right to use
its employee's invention had evolved from a license based on the
employee's consent to one based on the employer's investment in
the employee's labor and its contribution of materials and other
support. The latter form of license became known as the em-
ployer's "shop right." By the end of the century, the law had
evolved from a rule that was quite protective of the rights of the
employee-inventor to one that was still somewhat respectful of
the employee. Even at the end of the century, however, the em-
ployee still owned the patent to his invention and his employer
had nothing other than a license to use it without paying royal-
ties.
To explain the courts' willingness to see employees as the
rightful owners of their inventions, one may look to the long tra-
dition of craft autonomy among the skilled trades. Until the latter
part of the nineteenth century, skilled craft workers successfully
asserted their rights to control the craft knowledge used in the
production process.' 8 Skilled workers were understood to pos-
sess-as their own attribute, not as a company resource-the
specialized knowledge that was essential to their trade. But in-
dustrialization changed the popular, and thus legal, under-
standing of who owned and controlled the knowledge relevant to
the production process. The last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury witnessed a radical loss of autonomy for skilled craft work-
ers. The increased mechanization of work, accompanied by the
systematization of management that ultimately became known as
Taylorism (after its most influential proponent, Frederick Wins-
sons to receive a salary from the defendant rather than to demand a royalty, is entitled to
a less favorable consideration by a court of equity than if his conduct had been that of
mere inaction." Id.
Two years later, in Keyes v Eureka Consolidated Mining Co, 158 US 150, 152-53
(1895), the Court held that an employer could use the invention of two employees during
their employment without paying a royalty. After termination, the employer would ordi-
narily have to pay a royalty, but in Keyes the inventors' delay in demanding a royalty
barred their claim on the ground of laches. Id at 153-54.
The Court recognized the employer's license to royalty-free use of an employee's inven-
tion for an unlimited time in Gill v United States, 160 US 426, 430 (1896). The Court ruled
that, by allowing the employer to use the invention, the employee was "precluded ever af-
terwards" from making a claim for a royalty.
Although in one early case a court awarded a royalty to an employee who had
promptly demanded compensation for the employer's use of his invention that he had de-
veloped without using the employer's resources, Burton v Burton Stock Car Co, 171 Mass
437, 50 NE 1029, 1030 (1898), by the twentieth century courts routinely denied compensa-
tion to employees for their employers' use of their patents.
"See, for example, David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor 9-57, 171-213
(Cambridge 1987). See also Barnes v Ingalls, 39 Ala 193, 201 (1863) (refusing to find an
agreement that all work done during term of employment must be on employer's behalf).
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low Taylor), led employers successfully to claim a right to control
the knowledge and skill involved in the production process. 1°9
Employer rights to use this knowledge (even if not to own it out-
right) came, by the end of the century, to be seen as essential to
efficient production and, more generally, to economic develop-
ment.
Even as the shop right doctrine became more favorable to
employers, the courts retained considerable sympathy for the
employee-inventor. After all, the shop right gave the employer
only a license, not ownership of the patent. The courts' enduring
unwillingness to transform the employer's shop right into an
ownership right may be attributed to admiration of inventors and
faith in the power of technological development to enrich the na-
tion, which was part of nineteenth century American culture." °
" On the enormous influence of Taylorism in undermining the power of skilled craft
workers to control the processes of work, and in creating a general popular craze for effi-
ciency in the management of all aspects of life, see Robert Kanigel, The One Best Way:
Frederick Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency (Viking 1997); Samuel Haber, Efficiency
and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era 1890-1920 (Chicago 1964).
"' Examples of the hero-inventor genre of the history of American technology include
Roger Burlingame, March of the Iron Men: A Social History of Union Through Invention
vii (Grosset & Dunlap 1938) (arguing that "technological invention" was the most impor-
tant factor in "the evolution of that social pattern which produced a nation from the
United States"); Holland Thompson, The Age of Invention: A Chronicle of Mechanical Con-
quest vii (Yale 1921) (describing "the personalities of some of the outstanding American
inventors" and "the significance of their achievements).
On the similar iconography of inventors in England, see Harold Irvin Dutton, The Pat-
ent System and Inventive Activity During the Industrial Revolution 1750-1852 1-2 (Man-
chester 1984) ("From Samuel Smiles [Industrial Biography (Ticknur and Fields 1864), and
Lives of the Engineers: Early Engineering (Murray 1874)], who saw the industrial revolu-
tion almost entirely in terms of the heroic inventor, right through to the late Ralph Davis's
book on foreign trade [The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade (Leicester
1979)], inventive activity has, in varying degrees, frequently been cited as one of the more
significant explanations of the industrial revolution.").
Much of the academic literature on invention and technology has attempted to debunk
the myth of the hero-inventor and to develop a more nuanced view of the causes and char-
acteristics of invention and its relation to economic development. For example, one widely
cited book from the 1930s claimed:
The popular belief in individual, single, great inventors for things has been gro-
tesquely developed by the same process as that which built all the classic mythologies
to account for the origins of this and that, so that our traditional great inventors,
even when really great and the doers of much of what is ascribed to them, are still,
from another aspect, mythic heroes in our school-propagated national epos.
The American popular belief that McCormick invented the reaper may be worth mil-
lions to the International Harvester Co., the fame of Bell certainly is to the telephone
company, Fulton is the hero of the Hudson River Day Line, Edison and Marconi of
various companies, and the Wright Brothers of the Wright Aero Corporation, while
the rival Curtis Interests set dead Langley on an airplane, like the Cid on his horse
again, to fight their battle....
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Central to this faith was reverence for the genius of the great in-
ventors and the miracle of their accomplishments.' The impor-
tance ascribed to invention led to a mythology about the inventive
process. The popular and even the academic vision of invention in
the nineteenth century was that of the genius alone in his work-
shop, tinkering away until suddenly a bright idea came to him in
a flash (what was sometimes called a "Eureka moment")." 2
The reality of the great invention . . . is a conglomeration of detail inventions so
vastly numerous that no one hero, nor country, nor century is enough to define it.
S.C. Gilfillan, The Sociology of Invention 77-78 (Follet 1935).
Indeed, the reaction against the hero-inventor thesis in favor of the view that techno-
logical change is entirely incremental has recently produced a counter-reaction. Scholars
have called for at least some attention to be paid to the contributions of particular per-
sons:
Some historians insist that almost all invention consists of... "technological drift,"
consisting mostly of anonymous, small, incremental improvements. As a reaction to
heroic theories of invention in which all improvements are attributed to individual
geniuses, the drift theory has been justly influential. But is it not possible to go too
far in the other direction and give too little credit to major inventions made by a vital
few?
Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress 12 (Ox-
ford 1990) (citations omitted).
. Turn-of-the-century students of the English Industrial Revolution
were likely to be confronted with an elaborate description of the "great" inventions of
the eighteenth century, accompanied by diagrams of strings and wires which pur-
ported to be the water frame or the power loom. The whole discussion left a cloudy
impression that somehow the eighteenth century in England must have been an es-
pecially brainy period, when inventors suddenly abounded and, by their cerebrations,
brought the marvellous new machines of the age into being.
Frederick C. Dietz, Book Review of Abbott Payson Usher, A History of Mechanical Inven-
tions (McGraw-Hill 1929), 35 Am Hist Rev 399, 399 (1930). A 1921 history argued that in-
vention helped to civilize man and that "it is to inventors mainly that we owe all that civi-
lization is, it is to inventors mainly that we must look for all that civilization can be made
to be." R.S. Woodward, Book Review of Bradley A Fiske, Invention, the Master-Key to
Progress (Dutton 1921), 27 Am Hist Rev 541, 541-42 (1922), quoting Fiske, Invention at 5.
"'Examples of the hero-inventor genre include Thompson, The Age of Invention at vii
(cited in note 110) (describing "the personalities of some of the outstanding American in-
ventors"), and, more recently, a book whose title reveals much, Mitchell Wilson, American
Science and Invention: A Pictorial History: The Fabulous Story of How American Dream-
ers, Wizards, and Inspired Tinkerers Converted a Wilderness Into the Wonder of the World
(Simon & Schuster 1954). See also Edmund Fuller, Tinkerers and Genius: The Story of the
Yankee Inventors (Hastings House 1955) (discussing New England inventors of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). On the death of the hero-inventor, see Roger
Burlingame, Inventors Behind the Inventor 4 (Harcourt, Brace 1947) ("[T]he old-time in-
ventor-hero is no longer there when you go to look for him.").
The conventional account of Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton gin is illustrative.
While visiting a southern plantation, Whitney learned from his hosts that it was difficult
to remove the seeds from cotton. As the story goes, Whitney pondered, tinkered, and in a
few days produced the cotton gin that revolutionized cotton processing, guaranteed the
South a lucrative cotton crop, sealed the fate of thousands of black people as slaves, and
ultimately brought on the Civil War. See, for example, Bruce Catton, The Civil War 3
(American Heritage 1971); Kenneth C. Davis, Don't Know Much About the Civil War 42
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Popular stories on Thomas Edison beginning in the 1870s "[flixed
in the public mind ... the image of Edison in a Napoleon-like
pose brooding over an incandescent lamp that, we are told, was
invented by a hunt-and-try technique assisted by a stroke of
genius. In the lore of invention, the lamp sprang without prece-
dent from his massive brow.""' Not until the latter half of the
twentieth century did published accounts of invention emphasize
the growing significance of organized corporate research and de-
velopment." The popular understanding of the hero-inventor's
importance in the Industrial Revolution permeated the discourse
of patent law, and indeed other areas of commercial law,
throughout the nineteenth century."5
(William Morrow 1996). Even some of the contemporary revisionist accounts adhere to the
individual genius paradigm; they just emphasize that the geniuses weren't all white men.
See Anne L. MacDonald, Feminine Ingenuity: Women and Invention in America xx-xxiv
(Ballantine 1992) (discussing whether a crucial idea for the cotton gin came from Whit-
ney's hostess, Catherine Greene); Portia P. James, The Real McCoy: African-American In-
vention and Innovation, 1619-1930 (Smithsonian 1989) (describing the many inventions of
African-Americans).
.. Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Innovation and Technological
Enthusiasm 1870-1970 19 (Viking 1989). Edison's phenomenal reputation as the "Wizard
of Melo Park' was established in 1878 by an article in a New York newspaper; stories at-
tributing him with almost occult power and astounding genius proliferated in the popular
press thereafter. See Wyn Wachhorst, Thomas Alva Edison: An American Myth 19-37
(MIT 1981). See also Rae, The Application of Science to Industry at 250 (cited in note 36)
("The ingenious tinkerer enjoyed an astonishing longevity as an American folkhero,
reaching an apex in fact in the twentieth century with Thomas A. Edison and Henry
Ford-though Edison depended far more on a well-equipped laboratory and a scientifically
trained staff than his popular image suggested.").
..4 Useful historiographic essays on the history of American technology include George
H. Daniels, The Big Questions in the History of American Technology, in Symposium: The
Historiography of American Technology, 11 Tech & Culture 1, 6-21 (1970); Thomas P.
Hughes, Emerging Themes in the History of Technology, 20 Tech & Culture 697, 700-09
(1979). A history of two prominent nineteenth century inventions that mixes the modem
and the traditional ways of thinking about invention is Brooke Hindle, Emulation and In-
vention (NYU 1981) (using the examples of the steamboat and the telegraph to explore the
social and psychological nature of the inventive process).
In fact, well into the twentieth century, comparatively few firms systematically in-
vested in research and development. See Galambos, The American Economy and the Reor-
ganization of the Sources of Knowledge at 277 (cited in note 9); Lamoreaux and Sokoloff,
Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology at 32 (cited in note 36).
"'An early and typical example is Chancellor Kent's 1812 decision on the validity of
the monopoly on Hudson River traffic that the New York legislature had granted to one
steamboat pioneer. In discussing the propriety of the monopoly, Chancellor Kent cele-
brated the advent of steamboats:
Every lover of the arts, every patron of useful improvement, every friend to his coun-
try's honor, has beheld this success with pleasure and admiration. From this single
source the improvement is progressively extending to all the navigable waters of the
United States, and it promises to become a great public blessing, by giving astonish-
ing facility, despatch and safety, not only to travelling, but to the internal commerce
of this country. It is difficult to consider even the known results of the undertaking,
without feeling a sentiment of good will and gratitude towards the individuals by
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The pro-employee character of the early cases involving em-
ployee inventions may thus be attributed both to the pre-
industrial tradition of craft autonomy and control over the "mys-
teries" of their trade, and to the Industrial Revolution's ideology
of the genius inventor as the catalyst of technological change and
economic growth. Between 1840 and 1900, these twin paradigms
began to erode as the economy became more industrialized, firms
grew in size and number, and more and more people-including
inventors-went to work as employees. Courts began to see the
importance to firms of freely using the knowledge of their em-
ployees. Dempsey, the Pennsylvania decision rejecting the evi-
dence of the custom that carpet dyers own their own recipes, was
an effort to rid the law of what that court regarded as antiquated
artisan customs and to favor the efficiency of centralized firm
control over all of its technology." 6 The court used this branch of
patent law in a self-consciously instrumental fashion to promote
economic development." 7
whom they have been procured, and who have carried on their experiment with pa-
tient industry, at great expense, under repeated disappointments, and while con-
stantly exposed to be held up, as dreaming projectors, to the whips and scorns of
time.
Livingston v Van Ingen, 9 Johnson 507, 585 (NY 1812).
.For a discussion of the Dempsey decisions, see notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
"It has been said that the eighteenth century patent system focused mainly on re-
warding the inventor for his effort rather than on creating incentives to maximize eco-
nomic development and that nineteenth century courts and commentators saw patent law
in instrumental terms, focusing on public benefit more than on private reward. See Steven
Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 Tech & Culture 932, 938-50
(1991). On the development of the instrumental view of English patent law, see Dutton,
The Patent System and Inventive Activity During the Industrial Revolution at 79-81 (cited
in note 110). The courts' approach to employee patents bears out this thesis, as do Morton
Horwitz's and Willard Hurst's suggestions about the development of law generally. See
Horwitz, Transformation I at 30 (cited in note 22); James Willard Hurst, Law and the
Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States 6-32 (Wisconsin 1956). On
the instrumental use of patent law to promote economic development in the early nine-
teenth century, see Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts:
American Patent Law and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part 1), 79 J Pat & Trademark Off
Society 61, 75-76 (1997), citing Whitney v Emmett, 29 F Cases 1074, 1082 (Cir Ct E D Pa
1831) (discussing the role of patent in promoting technological gain by rewarding inven-
tors); Godson, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Patents at 19 (cited in note 44) (A patent
is "a reward to those who would exert their abilities, employ their time, and spend their
money in the production of something new and useful to the community" and is a "recom-
pence" to the inventor.). On the development of the English patent system before 1800 and
the English antecedents to the American system, see MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial
Revolution (cited in note 26).
The transition between the private reward and public benefit views is evident in the
opinion of Chancellor Kent in Livingston. In referring to steamboats on the Hudson be-
tween Albany and New York City, Kent emphasized both that the steamboat "promises to
become a great public blessing" and that one must feel "gratitude" toward those "Who have
carried on their experiment with patient industry, at great expense, under repeated dis-
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Even as courts began to realize that control over the produc-
tion process--and thus craft knowledge-was essential to the
employer's right to manage, they might still have been reluctant
to reject an employee's ownership of an innovation that was dis-
tinct from his general craft knowledge. However, if the innovation
or invention were incorporated in the employer's normal proc-
esses of production over an extended period, judges were more in-
clined to see it as an asset of the firm rather than of the em-
ployee. To grant the employee an exclusive right to such an in-
vention would be too great an interference with the employer's in-
terest in controlling the business. Indeed, judges likely saw it as
overreaching if the employee left for a rival employer and at-
tempted to deny the former employer the right to use the process
at all, depriving the public of the benefits of competition.118 Thus,
the McClurg headnote's emphasis on the employer's contribution
to the invention through wages and time articulated a rationale
for the shop right that ultimately persuaded judges and lawyers
more than the Court's opinion did. The headnote expressed an
emerging sense of the value to employers of owning their employ-
ees' brain work as well as their physical work.
Changes in the nature of production associated with the rise
of the factory and the spread of the corporate form of ownership
helped judges and lawyers portray these cases differently than
before. In the past they were seen as a dispute between two indi-
viduals, with the employer as a person trying to take an idea that
was not his. Now, however, they were portrayed as a dispute be-
tween an organization, to which the employee had belonged, and
the employee-inventor who was trying to take for himself an idea
that was one of the organization's valuable assets.
Finally, both employers and courts began to see employee in-
ventions as a branch of master-servant law. This change in legal
category proved to be very significant because it occurred just as
the hierarchical law of "master and servant" became more sys-
tematized, as legal texts spread that law to employment relations
appointments .... ." 9 Johnson at 585. Also, Willard Phillips's 1837 treatise said in the
same paragraph both that patents were a "reward" and that a "reason for granting this
species of monopoly, is, that the whole community has an interest in the advancement of
the useful arts, since the greater the perfection to which they are brought, the greater will
be the amount of necessaries, conveniences, comforts, luxuries and amusements, within
reach of every one ... ." Phillips, The Law of Patents for Inventions at 12 (cited in note 33)
(emphasis removed). Both reward and incentive continued to appear in nineteenth cen-
tury treatises, but ultimately the encouragement rationale became predominant. See Wal-
terscheid, 79 J Pat & Trademark OffSociety at 75-76.
"'The author is indebted to Daniel Ernst for suggesting this.
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to which it had not previously applied, and as the nature of em-
ployment became more bureaucratized."9
The law of shop right today is much as it was in 1900. The
Supreme Court's last pronouncement on the subject, involving a
dispute between the government and a former employee over air-
plane radio technology, articulated the rule and rationale on
which the courts still rely. The Court made it clear that the basis
of the shop right is the employment contract: "The respective
rights and obligations of employer and employee" concerning an
invention conceived by the employee "spring from the contract of
employment."2 ' Depending on the circumstances, among the
rights the employment contract implicitly gives the employer is a
shop right in an employee invention developed on the job. The ra-
tionale, the Court made clear, was the employer's financial con-
tribution to the investment: "Since the servant uses his master's
time, facilities, and materials to attain a concrete result, the lat-
ter is in equity entitled to use that which embodies his own prop-
erty .... " 2 1 This is the shop right doctrine that exists in every
state today,"= and it represents the culmination of the first major
conceptual shift in the ownership of ideas at work.
D. Ownership or License: The Inconsistent Treatment of
Hirings to Invent
Just after the shop right evolved from an estoppel-based no-
tion to an employment-based one, courts began to permit the em-
ployer to claim not merely a license but outright ownership of the
employee's inventions if the employee had been "hired to invent."
The development of a set of rules for the category of employees
"'See Sanford M. Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Trans-
formation of Work in American Industry, 1900-1945 (Columbia 1985); Tomlins, Law, La-
bor, and Ideology at 259-61 (cited in note 10).
"I United States v Dubilier Condenser Corp, 289 US 178, 187 (1933).
"Id at 188-89.
See, for example, California: Banner Metals, Inc v Lockwood, 178 Cal App 2d 643, 3
Cal Rptr 421, 431 (1960), citing Dubilier; Colorado: Hewett v Samsonite Corp, 32 Colo App
150, 507 P2d 1119, 1122 (1973), citing Kinkade v New York Shipbuilding Corp, 21 NJ 362,
122 A2d 360 (1956); Illinois: McKerman Co v Gregory, 252 Ill App 3d 514, 623 NE2d 981,
1004 (1993); New Jersey: Crowe v M&M/Mars, 242 NJ Super 592, 577 A2d 1278, 1280
(1990), quoting Dubilier; Kinkade, 122 A2d at 364-65; New York: Eenkhoorn v New York
Telephone Co, 130 Misc 2d 744, 497 NYS2d 303, 304 (Civ Ct 1986), citing Dubilier, affd,
148 Misc 2d 999, 568 NYS2d 677, 678 (App Term 1990); Ohio: Gemco Engineering &
Manufacturing Co v Henderson, 151 Ohio St 95, 84 NE2d 596, 599 (1949), citing Dubilier;
Pennsylvania: Aetna-Standard Engineering Co v Rowland, 343 Pa Super 64, 493 A2d
1375, 1379 (1985), citing Dubilier; Texas: American Medical Electronics, Inc v Korn, 819
SW2d 573, 575 (Tex Ct App 1991). See generally Annotation, Application and Effect of
"Shop Right Rule" on License Giving Employer Limited Rights in Employees' Inventions
and Discoveries, 61 ALR2d 356, 370 (1958).
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who were hired specifically to invent was the second major con-
ceptual shift in the ownership of ideas in the employment rela-
tionship. However, the content of the category remained unclear.
The line that courts drew (and still draw) was that employers got
only a shop right when the employee's hiring was "general," and
the employer got ownership when the employee had been hired to
devise a particular invention or to develop an employer's idea.
The distinction between "general" hirings and "hirings to invent"
has always been murky. The flexibility of the rule and its empha-
sis on broad characterizations of the nature of the employment
meant that valuable property rights rested on judges' views about
employees' abilities and about whether creativity is a skill that is
sold in various types of work relationships. As judges' views of in-
ventorship evolved from an individual genius to a corporate re-
search and development paradigm, the application of the law
evolved as well, even though the rule appeared to remain un-
changed."=
The very earliest published opinions addressing the hiring-
to-invent concept were patent infringement cases or appeals from
Patent Office interference proceedings. In these cases the courts
thought their task was to decide whether the employee or the
employer had been the true inventor. As discussed above, in a
number of opinions from the 1820s through the 1860s," the
courts developed the notion that the employee was the inventor if
the substance of the invention were his idea, but the employer
was the inventor if the main idea were his.12' The rule was often
articulated in explicitly class-biased terms: was the employee "in-
ventive," or was he merely a "servant" with "manual dexterity," a
"mere instrument through which [the employer] realizes his
idea."26 Finally, in 1901, a court first stated that in patent inter-
ference proceedings where both the employer and employee
'"Under the current law, if the employee is hired to engage in general research and
development, the inventions likely will belong to the employer, even if the employer did
not designate the specific area in which the employee was to invent. See Roger M. Mil-
grim, 1 Milgrim on Trade Secrets § 5.02[4][b] at 5-64-5-65 (Matthew Bender 1994). As ex-
plained below, one hundred years ago a court probably would have determined that such a
hiring was a general hiring, not a hiring to invent. See text accompanying notes 139-77.
" See notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
'"See, for example, Dixon, 7 F Cases at 759; Alden, 1 F Cases at 330; Sparkman, 22 F
Cases at 879; Goodyear v Day, 10 F Cases 677, 677 (Cir Ct D NJ 1852); Teese, 23 F Cases
at 834; Dental Vulcanite, 7 F Cases at 502-03.
"
2 Wellman v Blood, 29 F Cases 628, 631 (Cir Ct DC 1856). See also King v Gedney, 14
F Cases 526, 530-31 (Cir Ct DC 1856). In one case, the court described the employee as "a
foreigner," "merely a workman or mechanic," and "a rover and a wanderer"; not surpris-
ingly, the court concluded that the inventive idea was the employer's. Miller v Kelley, 18
DC App 163, 169-71 (1901).
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claimed to be the inventor, "a presumption exists in favor of the
employer. "
127
The Supreme Court set the example for this method of
analysis in its influential 1868 decision, Agawam Woollen Co v
Jordan." The Court sought to determine ownership of an inven-
tion by assessing the character and abilities of the employee. The
alleged infringer in Agawam sought to invalidate the patent by
arguing that the employee, not the employer-patentee, was the
true inventor. The Court ruled that if an employee was hired to
work on an invention, the employer owned the right to the re-
sulting invention, at least if the employer supplied the initial idea
for the employee's invention. The case involved a "machinist and a
manufacturer of textile fabrics" who in 1824 hired a blacksmith to
help him devise a modification of the machinery for spinning yarn
from wool.' The invention devised by the manufacturer and his
blacksmith, which was patented in 1826, apparently proved to be
quite significant; the Court said that "[t]he patented improvement
soon came into universal use, and worked a revolution, both here
and in Europe, in the art of manufacturing fibrous yarns."30 The
Court determined that the employer had been the true inventor
and the employee had been hired only to assist, and therefore, the
employer was entitled to the patent. 3'
Agawam and like cases purported to decide only whether the
employee or the employer had been the actual inventor of a pat-
ented idea by determining which one of them was the sort of per-
son likely to have had such an idea.'32 These cases did not at-
tempt to decide whether the employee or the employer owned an
idea when it was clear the employee was the one who originally
'Miller, 18 DC App at 170. See also Jameson v Ellsworth, 40 DC App 164, 166 (1913)
("[T]he presumption of inventorship is in favor of the employer. Before this rule may be
invoked, however, it must appear that the employee was engaged in perfecting a device
under the general directions of the employer.").
" 74 US 583 (1868).
..Id at 585-87.
.'Id at 587-88.
"' The Court articulated the rule for such cases as follows:
Wihere a person has discovered an improved principle in a machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, and employs other persons to assist him in carrying out that
principle, and they, in the course of experiments arising from that employment, make
valuable discoveries ancillary to the plan and preconceived design of the employer,
such suggested improvements are in general to be regarded as the property of the
party who discovered the original improved principle, and may be embodied in his
patent as a part of his invention.
Id at 602-03.
"See Orcutt v McDonald, 27 DC App 228, 233 (1906); Kreag v Geen, 28 DC App 437,
440(1906).
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had the idea. But in the 1890s, these cases became the basis for a
rule that an employer owned outright the inventions of any em-
ployee whom it had hired specifically to invent. Thus, the courts
went from asking whether an idea originated with the employer
or employee to declaring that even an idea that clearly originated
with the employee was the employer's property. The crossover
began with the Supreme Court's Hapgood decision in 1886,
which, as explained above,'33 was also a leading shop right case.
In Hapgood, during the negotiations preceding Hewitt's
hiring as superintendent of the plaintiff's manufacturing depart-
ment, Hewitt touted "his experience in devising and making im-
provements" in plows.l" The Court found that the employer relied
on these representations in employing Hewitt to "devote his time
and services to devising improvements in, and getting up and
perfecting, plows adapted to the general trade of the corpora-
tion.""'35 A few years later, Hewitt and the company president de-
cided the firm should make a new iron riding plow, which Hewitt
devised and built with the aid of company employees.,6 After
leaving the company, Hewitt applied for and received a patent on
the plow and threatened to sue the corporation and its successor
for infiingement.37 Hewitt's former employer responded by
claiming complete ownership of the patent, not just a shop right
(which is what the courts ultimately granted), on the grounds
that it had hired Hewitt expressly to invent the plow.3 '
Both the lower court and the Supreme Court rejected the
employer's ownership claim. The lower court eventually con-
cluded that Hewitt owned the invention, although it acknowl-
edged that the employer had contributed to the inventive effort
by paying Hewitt, providing him with the assistance of other em-
ployees, and paying for the materials and labor used in the con-
struction.'39 It explained that while an employer might own its
employees' inventions if "they have been hired and paid to exer-
cise their inventive faculties for their employers," that was not
the case with Hewitt. 4 ° Rather, in the court's view, Hewitt's em-
ployer sought only Hewitt's "experience in the manufacture and
sale of plows, and [his] . . . thorough knowledge of that busi-
'"See text accompanying notes 83-86.
3 119 US at 229.
'"Id.
'"Id at 230.
"'Id at 231.
'"Id at 231-32.
'"Hapgood v Hewitt, 11 F 422 (Cir Ct D Ind no date).
"' Id at 424.
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ness." The terms of Hewitt's employment did not expressly re-
quire him to exercise his "inventive faculties" for his employer,
and therefore the employer did not own the patent." The Su-
preme Court agreed. The Court found no evidence of "any agree-
ment between the corporation and Hewitt that the former was to
have the title to his inventions, or to any patent that he might ob-
tain for them."'
Both the circuit court and the Supreme Court interpreted the
evidence and drew legal conclusions in a manner strikingly dif-
ferent from what today's courts would do. Hewitt and the com-
pany president had agreed that the firm should design and
manufacture the new plow, and Hewitt thereupon set about doing
so on the firm's generous payroll (receiving $3,000 a year), using
the firm's materials and workers. If the case were decided today,
courts would likely conclude that Hewitt had been acting on be-
half of the firm when he devised the new plow, and therefore that
the firm owned the invention. This conclusion would likely be
reached either because Hewitt's fiduciary duty as an officer of the
firm would prevent him from appropriating for himself the work
he had done for the firm or because he had been directed to in-
vent.' But in the 1880s, the perception was different. In the first
place, Hewitt, not the company or its president, was unques-
tionably the inventor in the nineteenth century individualist un-
derstanding of invention, and that was the relevant question un-
der Agawam. If the courts began with the idea that the true in-
ventor is entitled to the patent (which is what Agawam said) and
that invention is an individual rather than a corporate activity,
then Hewitt clearly was entitled to the patent. In addition, the
courts thought Hewitt was entitled to the patent as a matter of
just policy because it was his idea. The inventor's claim to owner-
ship of his ideas trumped the firm's investment, the officer's fidu-
ciary duty, and even the notion that Hewitt was a servant em-
ployed and paid by his employer to do brain work.
Four years later, the Court began to back away slightly from
this statement. In Solomons v United States,'45 the Supreme
Court attempted to reconcile the various cases on employee in-
ventions and to chart out a structure for deciding when the em-
ployment relationship entitled the employer to a shop right or to
1
41 Id.
142Id.
119 US at 233.
'"See, for example, Standard Parts Co v Peck, 264 US 52, 59-60 (1924); Muenzer v
W.F. & John Barnes Co, 9 111 App 2d 391, 133 NE2d 312, 318-21 (1956).
'41137 US 342 (1890).
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ownership of employee inventions. The case involved the chief of
the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, who had designed a self-
canceling stamp at the request of the government. 46 Although the
House Ways and Means Committee and the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue approved the design for the government's use,
and employees of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing prepared
a die for the stamp using government property, the Court held
that the government had only a shop right to use the stamp, not
ownership of it.'47
The Court began by postulating that an employee's inven-
tions are his own:
The government has no more power to appropriate a man's
property invested in a patent than it has to take his property
invested in real estate; nor does the mere fact that an inven-
tor is at the time of his invention in the employ of the gov-
ernment transfer to it any title to, or interest in it. An em-
ployS, performing all the duties assigned to him in his de-
partment of service, may exercise his inventive faculties in
any direction he chooses, with the assurance that whatever
invention he may thus conceive and perfect is his individual
property." s
The Court then said, however, that when an employee is hired to
invent something in particular, the employer would own the in-
vention, not just a right to use it. "That which he has been em-
ployed and paid to accomplish becomes, when accomplished, the
property of his employer. Whatever rights as an individual he
may have had in and to his inventive powers, and that which
they are able to accomplish, he has sold in advance to his em-
ployer." 149
If the Court had actually applied this rule to the facts of the
case, it could have concluded that the employer owned the stamp.
Although the employee-inventor had not been hired specifically to
invent (as the head of a government bureau, he presumably had a
great many other responsibilities), the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and their deputies had
specifically directed him to design a self-canceling stamp.5 ° The
Court could easily have viewed his employment as encompassing
the specific task of invention. Thus, the actual holding of Solo-
"RId at 342-43
,'Id at 343-45, 347-48.
"'Id at 346.
1'4 Id.
Id at 344.
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mons was less sympathetic to employer ownership than was the
rule in the opinion. The opinion reveals a Court of two minds on
the issue of employee inventions. On the one hand, the law of
master and servant would seem to give employers broad rights in
their employees' work product; on the other, the Court cleaved to
the idea that an inventor had a right to his inventions.
Between 1890 and 1920, courts around the country decided
dozens of cases on this issue. By the end of that time courts came
to regard the hiring-to-invent inquiry as calling for an examina-
tion of the employment contract,' but the turn-of-the-century
cases did not. They instead employed two strategies to determine
when the employer was entitled to the invention and when he
was entitled to simply a license. In a few-cases, the courts focused
mainly on the abilities of the employee. In most, the courts ex-
amined the nature of the job or the nature of the employment-
whether an employee had been hired either to invent a specific
thing or to exercise his "inventive faculties." The factual inquiry
left ample room for the operation of judicial class bias in charac-
terizing the nature of the employment, the employee's abilities,
and his position in the firm. 52
A minority of courts decided whether an employee had been
hired to invent by evaluating the character or ability of the em-
ployee as a person. As a 1903 law review article phrased it, the
main consideration in assessing conflicting employer and em-
ployee claims to the same invention was: "What sort of man men-
tally, i.e. with reference to his inventive capacity, is the employer;
what sort of man mentally is the employee... ?"' A famous 1920
California case is illustrative.M A Hollywood production company
successfully persuaded a court that Cecil B. DeMille, rather than
an electrician, had invented a device for gradually dissolving the
lights. The Hollywood movie company's lawyers had little trouble
persuading the court that DeMille, not the anonymous electri-
cian, was the genius behind the advance in motion picture tech-
nology.'55 The court concluded that DeMille had conceived the in-
'
51 See cases cited in notes 259-70.
"As one early law review commentator said, determining ownership was not a prob-
lem in the cases "where the employer does all the inventing and the employee does only
work requiring 'mechanical skill.' As soon, however, as the employee begins to think that
his 'mechanical skill' has turned to inventive skill the trouble begins.. . ." Dwight B.
Cheever, The Rights of Employer and Employee to Inventions Made by Either During the
Relationship, 1 Mich L Rev 384, 385 (1903). That an employee might indeed have inven-
tive skill seemed beyond the imagination of the writer.
" Id at 392.
"'Famous Players-Lasky Corp v Ewing, 49 Cal App 676, 194 P 65 (1920).
' 194 P at 65-66.
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vention and that the electrician had merely put the idea into
practice as part of his employment "to improve the light in every
way possible and to use his expert knowledge and ability in that
direction."1
56
Some judges combined examination of the employee's abili-
ties with consideration of whether particular occupational catego-
ries involved the use of "inventive skill." In one 1891 New Jersey
case, for example, an employee had been hired as a superinten-
dent in a shop manufacturing gas motors for streetcars. The court
puzzled over whether a superintendent in such a shop would ex-
ercise "inventive faculties."157 The court decided a shop foreman
would not be hired to invent.' In a similar 1896 New York case,
the judge tried to decide whether a machine shop foreman who
devised an improved machine for making radiators had been
hired to invent.5 9 The employer claimed it had hired the foreman
because he could operate malfunctioning machines in the shop.
The foreman and his family testified by affidavit that he did not
discuss any invention in either of the two conversations he had
with his employer prior to entering his employ.'" The court found
"untenable" the employer's argument that he had purchased the
employee's inventive faculties, "because the rate of compensation,
$3.50 per day, was not excessive or unusual in the employment of
men capable of taking charge of and operating an important
manufacturing plant."6'
Some cases claimed to focus on what the court regarded as
the express or implied terms of employment in the parties' con-
tract. Yet to decide what those terms were, the courts relied on
assessments of the employee's abilities, job title, or status. In a
1904 case, for example, the employer tried unsuccessfully to
claim ownership of the invention by alleging that a mechanical
engineer had been hired "'to give his time, skill, and attention
and inventive ability' to the service of his employer in and about
"'Id at 66.
' Connelly Manufacturing Co v Wattles, 49 NJ Eq 92, 23 A 123, 124 (1891).
"'The employee testified that in the negotiations for his employment contract nothing
was "said respecting his inventive faculties, or the employment thereof, or that he would
be required, either as his sole work or as a part of his work, to try to perfect the motor or
to cure its faults.. . ." Naturally, the employer saw it differently. The company vice presi-
dent testified that the defendant "was to give us the benefit of his whole time, skill,
knowledge and ability in improving and perfecting our motor; and it was our distinct un-
derstanding that, as the consideration for giving him a larger salary than he demanded,
we should secure, with respect to our motor, all the fruits of his skill and inventive ability
as applied to it under our supervision." 23 A at 124.
"'Niagara Radiator Co v Meyers, 16 Misc 593, 40 NYS 572, 573-74 (S Ct 1896).
"040 NYS at 575.
1 Id.
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cheapening and improving the process used in his business." 2
The court decided this was not a sufficient allegation of a hiring
specifically to invent and awarded only a shop right." The em-
ployee, the court found, only "was expected to devote his time and
service to the cheapening of the processes."' Because "nothing
was said upon the subject of inventions, or the use of his inven-
tive faculties for their benefit," the court decided that the agree-
ment "to devote his knowledge, skill and service to the cheapen-
ing and improving of the processes used in the factory" did not
encompass an agreement to use "the inventive faculty also."'65
When a manufacturer hired an employee to design a machine
to manufacture the employer's product, in most cases the courts
concluded that such an employment granted the manufacturer
only a shop right in the machine, not ownership of the patent."
As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated in its 1908
'-Barber, 129 F at 372.
'"Id at 373.
64Id.
"'Id. This was also one of a number of cases that decided whether an agreement to
"develop" the employer's process or product constituted a hiring to invent. In Annin, 44
Hun at 353-54, the New York Supreme Court found that an employee paid a weekly wage
to "develop" the employer's wheelbarrow and truck business had been hired speciically to
assist in the invention of a better wheelbarrow and truck. The court therefore ordered the
employee to assign the patent to the employer.
The special service of inventing is the entire scope of the employment. There is no
room left within the employment for inventing on his own hook. The servant has no
right to think or invent for himself on this particular subject matter in hand. He must
get out of such a relation before he can claim the product of his work under such an
employment. He cannot carry off both his salary and the only valuable product of his
work under such an employment, leaving his master with his useless models, the re-
sults of his uselessly spent money on tools, machinery, time, labor of self and employ-
ees, with only a license or shop right which is not assignable or useful in any way
save to himself.
Id at 356.
Until the 1920s, courts generally construed an employment "to develop" the employer's
business or the employer's product as a general hiring, not a hiring to invent. The employ-
ers obtained a shop right in the patents for inventions the employees developed during
such employment, but the employers did not ordinarily have the right to the patents
themselves. This rather pro-employee rule persisted until the Supreme Court rejected it in
its influential 1924 decision in Standard Parts Co, 264 US 52, discussed in text accompa-
nying notes 201-04.
"See, for example, Whiting, 29 F Cases at 1060, in which the court determined that an
employee hired specifically to invent owned the patent because the invention at issue was
not within the employer's principal line of business. Whiting, a manufacturer of dry goods,
hired Howard to make improvements on a sewing machine in order to facilitate the sew-
ing of ruffles. Although Howard assigned a one-half interest in the patented improvement
to Whiting, Whiting sued for infringement. The court rejected the infringement claim:
"[Tihere would seem to be no good reason why Howard should not receive some benefit
from the use of his inventions in other factories than Whiting's, and from the sale of his
inventions to others." Id.
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decision of this category, American Circular Loom Co v Wilson,"
an employee who invented an improved machine to make his em-
ployer's product owned the machine patent because he had not
been hired specifically to invent a machine, but only to make the
product (which in that case was tubing to cover electric wires).
The court explained:
How far the rule will be held to be applicable where it ap-
pears that by the express terms of the hiring the employee
was to exercise his inventive faculties with reference to the
specific inventions in question for the sole benefit of his em-
ployer, we need not now consider, for that question does not
arise in this case."
In all of these cases, the spoken or unspoken rationale for the
courts' reluctance to find that the employer owned an improve-
ment that an employee designed was that an employee's idea was
his inalienable property. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1887
said so explicitly when it rejected an employer's claim that its fi-
nancial and material support of an employee's inventive process
entitled it to own inventions developed on the job. The court em-
phasized that the employer's contribution by way of time and ma-
terials was less significant than the employee's contribution of
the novel idea: "The mere fact that, in making the invention, an
employ6 uses the materials of his employer, and is aided by the
services and suggestions of his co-employ6s and employer in per-
fecting and bringing the same into successful use, is insufficient
to preclude him from all right thereto as an inventor."69 The em-
ployer's claim that its contribution of material and labor entitled
it to own the product, "confound[s] the machine with the inven-
tion it embodies. Of course there must be a machine which will
operate before it can be patented. That implies material, work-
manship, and skill combined. But such combination of itself is not
enough to secure a patent."7 ° Because the employee alone sup-
plied the idea, the court felt the employee alone should own the
patent. A patentable invention "must also embody an original
"'198 Mass 182, 84 NE 133 (1908).
" 84 NE at 135.
" Fuller & Johnson Manufacturing Co v Bartlett, 68 Wis 73, 31 NW 747, 752 (1887).
In that case, an employee of a harvesting machinery firm devised a grasping device to im-
prove the operation of the firm's reapers. Officers of the firm told the employee that he
had a right neither to his invention nor to the patent because he had made the invention
while in their employ and had used the firm's materials. The employee's invention was in-
corporated into the firm's reapers, and the firm's patent attorneys applied for a patent on
the device. The employee refused to assign the patent to the firm. 31 NW at 747-49.
' Id at 753.
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conception of a new and useful method of doing a specific thing. It
is this conception so embodied, evolved from the inventive facul-
ties of the defendant, which constituted the invention in ques-
tion.""'7 The court dismissed the employer's argument that the
employee's creativity was the product of "instruction, experience,
and knowledge" that the employer had given. The court found
these things "may aid and stimulate invention, but are no part of
it."
172
These pre-1920 courts rarely found that the employee had
been hired to invent unless there was an explicit agreement cov-
ering ownership of inventions. A general understanding that an
employee was hired to develop a product, machine, or process
usually was not enough to constitute a hiring to invent.' 3 For ex-
ample, in an 1895 case the employer alleged that it had hired the
inventor, a machinist, for the express purpose of building an im-
proved power press based on a rough idea.' 4 The court, however,
awarded only a license, because there was no express agreement
that the employer would own the resulting patent. Similarly, a
1910 Eighth Circuit decision held that a firm's director and busi-
ness manager who invented a new furnace grate-the firm's
product-while on the job was employed only generally and had
not contracted to give his employer "the fruit of his inventive
genius."' 6 He thus did not have to assign his patent to his em-
ployer.'
Sometime after 1910 the trend in the cases changed. Al-
though the doctrine itself remained the same, courts evaluated
the facts differently. The employers' lawyers apparently learned
to portray invention more as a collective and corporate-sponsored
enterprise and to emphasize the contributions of others in the in-
vention that the employee claimed for himself.
A good example of this change is the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Courtes 1921 decision in Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co
v Mica Condenser Co."'7 The court surveyed the law and identified
"Id.
"Id. See also Eustis Manufacturing Co v Eustis, 51 NJ Eq 565, 27 A 439, 441 (1893)
(granting license but not ownership).
" See, for example, Niagara Radiator Co, 40 NYS at 574 (stating that employee is en-
titled to a "presumption of ownership" of invention and that the employer's ownership
must be "clearly established" to rebut presumption).
" Withington-Cooley Manufacturing Co, 68 F at 501-02.
7 Id.
"'Johnson Furnace & Engineering Co v Western Furnace Co, 178 F 819, 823 (8th Cir
1910).
1" Id.
"'239 Mass 158, 131 NE 307 (1921).
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two lines of authority. The first held that "[a]n invention made by
an employee, in the course of his employment and at his em-
ployer's expense" was "the property of the inventor unless he has
by the terms of his employment, or otherwise, agreed to transfer
to his employer its ownership as distinguished from its use."79
The second, which became far more significant than the first, in-
volved employees "wholly engaged in 'experimental work,'" whose
job was to invent; in those cases, "the nature of the employment
impresses on the employee such a relationship of trust and confi-
dence as estops him from claiming as his own property that
which he has brought into being solely for the benefit and at the
express procurement of his employer."' As discussed below,
however, the opinion fudged on the crucial question of how to dis-
tinguish ordinary employment from experimental work.
The court's recognition that some employees are hired to en-
gage in "experimental work" reflected an awareness of how the
nature of firms had changed and corporate-sponsored research
had grown:
During the Great War the plaintiff made radio condensers
for the United States government. On the signing of the ar-
mistice, it became apparent that this industry would be seri-
ously affected if not ended, and the plaintiff's officers con-
ceived the idea of producing magneto condensers to be sold to
manufacturers of electrical apparatus. By June, 1919, the six
employees then remaining in the plaintiff's condenser de-
partment were employed in the experimental work in devel-
oping a method of manufacturing such condensers .... The
work was substantially all performed in the plaintiff's shop,
with its tools, at its expense, and under the general direction
and supervision of one Priess, its chief engineer.'
After describing the inventions, the court observed that they were
"in the main" those of one of the six employees engaged in "ex-
perimental work" and that some of them were the joint work of
several of the employees."8 2 In concluding that the firm, not the
individuals, owned the inventions, the courts legal analysis re-
flected a modern view of invention as a collective, corporate proj-
... 131 NE at 308. The Massachusetts high court placed its own 1908 pro-employee de-
cision, American Circular Loom, into this category. The court distinguished the case by
observing that it left open how the rule would apply when an employee was hired ex-
pressly for his creative talents. Id at 309.
' Id at 308-09.
... Id at 307-08.
'2 Id at 308.
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ect, rather than the "inventive genius" of the individual. Although
separated by just thirteen years, the contrast between American
Circular Loom's view in 1908 of invention as the inalienable
product of individual genius and Wireless Specialty's corporatist
view in 1921 of invention as a collective enterprise encapsulates
the difference between the nineteenth and twentieth century
views of employment and invention. 1"
One way that courts began to shift the perception of the facts
was by focusing on the employee's relationship to the firm rather
than on whether the employee was hired to invent. One example
is Dowse v Federal Rubber Co,"M a 1918 Illinois federal court de-
cision. Dowse considered whether a rubber tire firm owned the
patent, or only a shop right, to an improved automobile tire in-
vented by Dowse, a principal of the firm. The court determined
that the "all-important question is Dowse's relation to the tire-
manufacturing business. If he was only a hired man, taking or-
ders as to his work from another officer or employS, the invention
"That the transition was neither sudden nor uncontested appears from two widely
cited cases from federal courts in Pennsylvania. In the first, Pressed Steel Car Co v Han-
sen, 128 F 444 (Cir Ct W D Pa 1904), the court declined to order the erstwhile chief engi-
neer of the plaintiff company to transfer six patents to the employer. The employer alleged
that the engineer was bound by an oral contract to "devote his entire time, ability, and
skill" to the firm's "business and its advancement" and that "all inventions and improve-
ments that he might make during the period of his employment, and all letters patent
that might be obtained therefor, should be the sole property of" the company. Id at 444-45.
The Third Circuit, affirming, also declined to award the patent to the employer.
We have been referred to no case, nor have we been able to discover one in which,
apart from express contract or agreement, and upon the mere general relation of em-
ployer and employ6, and of the facts and circumstances attending it, the employer
has been vested with the entire property right in the invention and patent monopoly
of the employ6, or with anything more than a shop right, or irrevocable license, to use
the patented machine. Such a right in the employer the employd may be estopped to
deny, by the fact of his employment and his conduct in relation to the use of the in-
ventions by his employer, and to that extent and no farther have the cases gone.
137 F 403, 415-16 (3d Cir 1905). Fifteen years later, a district court in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania concluded that facts less clear than those in Pressed Steel did establish the
existence of an employment to invent. But the Third Circuit reversed and awarded only a
shop right. Ingle, the plaintiff in the patent infringement suit, had been employed as a de-
signer for the predecessor of Landis Tool Company and had designed a machine for them.
The district court held that the employer owned the patent for the machine because the
employee had been hired to design it. "He was paid for what he accomplished, and accom-
plished what he was paid for-to improve the machine of his employer, in order that it
might have greater value as such, and be more salable as such machine." Though there
was no written agreement concerning ownership of patents, the court concluded that "the
circumstances attending his employment, [and] the nature of the work he performed"
made clear that the employer should own the results. Ingle v Landis Tool Co, 262 F 150,
152-53 (M D Pa 1919). The Third Circuit disagreed and held the employer was entitled on
such facts only to a shop right, not to ownership of the patent. 272 F 464, 465 (3d Cir
1921).
'"254 F 308 (N D Ill 1918).
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belonged to him, leaving only an implied license or shop right to
the corporation, and this right was only personal to it, incapable
of being assigned."" But, if he was "more than a mere employS,
having the main responsibility to make the business successful,
then he should be compelled to assign the patent." 8' "[Tihe real
test," the court continued, "is whether Dowse occupied such a re-
lation to the corporation that he was its alter ego, in such a ca-
pacity that it is only consistent with good faith that he should
recognize its ownership of the patent issued to him.""8 7 The court
concluded that Dowse was too high up in the company and in too
important a position to regard him as a "mere employ6" and or-
dered him to assign the patent."
Focusing on the employee's position in the firm was, of
course, no less indeterminate than focusing on whether the em-
ployer had hired the employee as an inventor. Not surprisingly,
other courts drew precisely the opposite conclusion from the one
the Dowse court drew about whether high-level employees re-
tained exclusive or indeed any ownership of their inventions. 9
For example, a 1922 Michigan Supreme Court decision, Detroit
Testing Laboratory v Robison,'90 purported to accept in principle
that an employer might obtain rights to the inventions of its
high-level employees. Yet the court concluded that a chemist who
was not merely an employee, but also a stockholder, director, and
' Id at 309.
1NId.
.Id at 310.
'm Id at 315-16.
'"See, for example, Doscher v Phelps Guardant Time Lock Co, 89 Misc 561, 153 NYS
710, 711-12 (1915) (holding that the company's president and general manager could not
be compelled to assign his patent to a time lock, where his work on the invention was not
related to his duties as general manager; finding fiduciary duties of the president and
general manager not to be a sufficient reason to compel assignment), affd, 172 App Div
954, 157 NYS 1123 (1916). As one court summed it up in 1941, an executive "is not the
type of employee against whom shop rights are most naturally to be imputed." Dysart v
Remington Rand, Inc, 40 F Supp 596, 601 (D Conn 1941).
Massachusetts also rejected the notion that the inventions of an employee in a confi-
dential relationship or a high corporate position belong to the employer. In American Cir-
cular Loom Co, the court held that the defendant, a director of the plaintiff firm and the
superintendent of its manufacturing department, owned the right to an invention for a
machine to make circular tubing, which the plaintiff firm had been manufacturing with
another machine under another patent. 84 NE at 135. The court held that the employee-
inventor owned the patent, even though "[o]ne of the defendant's duties under his em-
ployment was to look after the plaintiff's machinery and to" improve it; the expenses of
procuring the patent were paid by the employer; and "[m]any machines embodying the in-
vention and built under the patent have been constructed under the direction and super-
vision of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, and have been used by it in its busi-
ness with his knowledge and consent; and the success of its business has largely depended
upon its use of these machines." Id.
'-221 Mich 442, 191 NW 218 (1922).
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officer, owned his invention. 9' The chemist, whose written con-
tract required him to "devote his entire time and attention to the
development and supervision of [the employer's] dairy and food
department and to cooperate in its general line of business," dis-
covered a method for improving the taste of coffee beans. 92 The
idea occurred to him while at a business lunch with someone in
the coffee business, who said that coffee importers had discovered
that coffee that spent longer in the hold of a ship tasted better
than coffee that had been shipped quickly.9 ' The chemist, sus-
pecting the reason was that micro-organisms affected the coffee
in the ship's hold over a period of months, developed a culture in
the firm's labs to duplicate the effect.'" Although the develop-
ment of the coffee culture would seem to be within the company's
business, and thus within the terms of Robison's contract, the
court concluded that his invention belonged to him, not to the
f=nn.1
9 5
In so concluding, the court portrayed the inventor as just a
"hired man" who "was free to exercise his inventive genius."'96 In
thus individualizing him, and in downplaying his relatively high
position in the firm, the court minimized the firm's contribution
to the invention, the close relationship between the invention and
the firm's business, and Robison's duty as a fiduciary of the firm:
He was not hired to exercise his inventive genius in the dis-
covery of patentable ideas for plaintiff. His skill as a chemist
and bacteriologist, and application thereof to the business he
was employed to conduct, could have no relation to his inven-
tive faculties, even though his genius was awakened or
quickened by suggestion arising in the course of the em-
ployment, unless made so by contract.'9
Holding otherwise, in the court's view, would deprive Robison of
the right to think freely, of "the right to reason from effect to
cause, and upon discovering a cause producing an effect, and a
method of commercializing the same, [to] constitute the result his
own property[.]" 98
The court distinguished Dowse on the basis that Robison's
"invention was not essential to the conduct of the business car-
'9'191 NW at 219-20.
'"Id at 219.
'Id.
14Id.
"Id at 219-20.
"Id at 219.
17Id.
9 Id.
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ried on by plaintiff. Neither was it discovered under an employ-
ment or, in the exercise of, an official duty in seeking after an es-
sential necessary to the business of plaintiff.""9 The court also
rejected the contention that, as a corporate officer, Robison owed
a fiduciary duty to the firm to assign the patent:
The company was conducting a laboratory business and was
entitled to have the loyal services of its officers, but such
services did not, and could not, reach and encompass the in-
ventive faculties of its officers. Mr. Robison owed no duty to
the company to exercise his inventive genius in its behalf,
and therefore breached no duty in taking for his own the
thought he developed into a patentable creation.'0°
In summary, from the late 1880s until the middle 1920s,
courts employed a highly fact-specific and unpredictable inquiry
for determining whether an employee had been hired to invent or
had simply invented in the context of a general employment.
Some cases focused on the employee's abilities, some on the na-
ture of the employment, and others on the employee's relation-
ship to the firm. In all, the courts' perception of the individualis-
tic nature of invention and of the desirable degree of subordina-
tion or independence of the employee or class of employees pro-
foundly influenced the outcomes of the cases.
The indeterminacy of this approach became apparent to
judges and commentators alike. The struggle to decide cases
based on factual assumptions about the inventive process and the
employment relationship failed to produce a useful heuristic de-
vice; as a result, courts searched for a different legal structure.
The developing law and discourse of contract offered an attractive
alternative. Gradually, courts ceased trying to allocate invention
rights by analyzing characteristics of the employee and his work
and instead sought signs of an express or implied contract.
The Supreme Court's decision in Standard Parts Co v Peck'
heralded both the end of judicial solicitude toward employee-
inventors and this transition to a contractual analysis. Peck, a
designer of machinery, was employed under a written contract
requiring him "to devote his time to the development of a process
and machinery for the production of the front spring now used on
the product of the Ford Motor Company."'02 The Sixth Circuit
concluded that, as the caselaw then stood, this was not a hiring to
'DId at 220.
2WId.
"1264 US 52 (1924).
Id at 59 (quoting the contract).
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invent,2 3 but the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the
employee had been hired to invent and that the employer had
therefore purchased the product of his work.2
After Standard Parts, courts began to resolve disputes over
ownership of employee inventions by analyzing what they sup-
posed were the intended terms of the employment contract rather
than, as had been the case, by applying a set of presumptions in
favor of employee ownership. At the same time, employers began
to use contracts more often to require employees to assign patent
rights, as discussed below. This change in how the courts and
employers treated the concept of a hiring to invent marked the
transition from the dominance of the shop right to the dominance
of the pre-invention assignment agreement.0 5
'Peck v Standard Parts Co, 282 F 443, 453 (6th Cir 1922).
'4Standard Parts, 264 US at 59-60.
'Employers and employees also contested ownership of patents in contexts other
than infringement actions or disputes about assignments or royalties. An 1876 Missouri
case, Green, 1 Mo App 202, involving the employer and employee's conflicting claims to a
patent, did not address ownership of the patent; rather, the case addressed whether the
employee breached his employment contract by allegedly fraudulently procuring a patent
on an idea that the employer claimed as its own. The employee sued for unpaid wages, and
the employer defended on the ground that the employee's allegedly wrongful effort to pat-
ent the employer's idea was a breach of contract entitling the employer to withhold the
wages. Id at 203-04. While declining for jurisdictional reasons to determine whether the
patent properly belonged to the employer or the employee, the court simply concluded:
We do not see in plaintiff's alleged fraudulent procurement of a patent any breach of
the contract .... It is not said that plaintiff promised defendant not to apply for a
patent. He was under the same general obligations not to defraud defendant in this
matter which the law imposes upon all citizens. But this obligation was not created
or increased by the contract of hiring....
Id at 205.
In a similar case thirteen years later, a New York court reached the same result. The
court concluded that a research chemist's allegedly wrongful failure to assign a patent was
not a ground for withholding wages, and that, under Hapgood, the employer had no right
to the chemist's patent in the first place. Clark v Fernoline Chemical Co, 5 NYS 190, 191
(NY S Ct 1889). This latter point is certainly a plausible reading of Hapgood, but the em-
ployer alleged that the chemist had been hired to "work with the defendant's products,
and endeavor to develop and discover new products and processes for the benefit of the de-
fendant." Id.
In light of the pro-employer at will rule (which developed during that era) and the
courts' hostility at that time to claims for unpaid wages by employees who quit, the courts'
sympathetic responses to the claims in Green and Clark are surprising. On the at will
rule, see Wood I § 134 at 271-74 (cited in note 31); Wood II § 136 at 282-86 (cited in note
31). See also Deborah A. Ballam, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule Revis-
ited: A Challenge to Its Origins As Based In the Development of Advanced Capitalism, 13
Hofstra Labor L J 75, 86-98 (1995) (arguing that New York has followed the at will rule
since the colonial era); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule,
20 Am J Legal Hist 118, 122-29 (1976). On recovery of wages by employees who quit, see
Wythe Holt, Recovery by the Worker Who Quits: A Comparison of the Mainstream, Legal
Realist, and Critical Legal Studies Approaches to a Problem of Nineteenth Century Con-
tract Law, 1986 Wis L Rev 677, 679-99.
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II. CONTRACTUAL DETERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP
OF INVENTIONS
A naked assignment or agreement to assign, in gross, a
man's future labors as an author or inventor,-in other
words, a mortgage on a man's brain, to bind all its future
products,-does not address itself favorably to our considera-
tion.
Justice Bradley"
We have seen the rise of two "default" rules for determining
ownership of employee inventions. First, the employee owns his
invention if he is hired "generally" rather than to invent a specific
thing; second, the employee's use of the employer's facility, work
time, or materials entitles the employer to claim only a shop right
or license, not ownership. These are the rules that for the last
ninety years or so have determined ownership of inventions-ex-
cept when the court decided that the employee and employer had
agreed otherwise. From the standpoint of employers seeking con-
trol over commercially valuable technology, the default rules have
always had two serious flaws. First, they are relatively protective
of employee-inventors, and second, they are notoriously flexible
and indeterminate, as noted above, impeding planning and in-
viting expensive litigation.
Yet these rules endured even in the face of severe criticism.
Their persistence may be attributed in part to their malleability,
which allowed courts hostile to one side or the other to follow the
law and yet to reach a desired outcome. Perhaps, too, their en-
durance can be ascribed to the rhetorical force of the notion that
inventors-even when employees-should own their ideas in a
country that still believes in the labor theory of value and the
myth of the heroic inventor. But, more significantly, these rules
most likely lasted because employers eventually figured out how
to avoid them.
Employers, lawyers, and courts concerned with giving em-
ployers more control over employees' inventions began to use the
practice and the discourse of contract to get around the default
rules. Employers created, lawyers emphasized, and courts en-
forced express agreements that any employee's inventions would
belong to the employer. More significantly, whether or not an ex-
press agreement regarding employee inventions in fact existed,
lawyers and judges increasingly relied on implied contracts or
understandings between the employer and employee that the in-
'Aspinwall Manufacturing Co v Gill, 32 F 697, 700 (Cir Ct D NJ 1887).
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ventions would belong to the employer. Contract allowed courts to
leave the default rules untouched, to increase the employer's
rights over employee inventions, and, most significantly, to make
this shift in ownership of ideas appear to be the product of free
choice and arms-length negotiation.
Although the use of express and implied contract concepts to
allocate invention rights increased at the turn of the century, it
was not a completely new practice. From the beginning, judges
occasionally regarded ownership of the inventions of an em-
ployee-inventor as a question of contract law when the parties
had an explicit agreement covering employee inventions. °7 But
express contract cases were rare until the early to mid-twentieth
century, and courts seldom invoked a notion of implied contract.
Compared to the large number of published nineteenth century
opinions concerning licenses or alleged hirings specifically to in-
vent, the number concerning contracts allocating invention rights
between employer and employee was small.20 ' The interpretation
and enforcement of patent assignment contracts in the context of
employment was not even mentioned in the antebellum patent
treatises.0 9
By the second decade of the twentieth century, however,
courts were more likely to conclude that the parties had an ex-
press or implied agreement granting ownership of an invention to
'See, for example, id at 700-01; Continental Wind Mill Co v Empire Wind Mill Co, 6
F Cases 366, 367 (Cir Ct N D NY 1871) (finding agreement that employee would receive
$500 for invention); Wilkens v Spafford, 29 F Cases 1242, 1243 (1878) (finding that em-
ployee was hired to invent and holding that the employment contract provided employer
would have inventions). In neither of these cases did the court order the former employee
to assign the patent. In Wilkens, the employer sued to establish his right to use the pat-
ented machines built while the defendant was in his employ. It is unclear whether the
employer sought assignment of the patents, but the court awarded only an "exclusive li-
cense" to use the machines. 29 F Cases at 1244. In Continental Wind Mill, the former em-
ployee sued for infringement of a patent for an invention he made while employed by the
defendant, and the court dismissed the suit because the employer had at minimum a li-
cense to use and sell the invention. 6 F Cases at 368. This left the employee free to use
and sell it too.
A case involving an express contract was among the Supreme Court's earliest cases
concerning ownership of employees' inventions. In Appleton v Bacon, 67 US 699, 700-02
(1862), the Court resolved conflicting claims of two parties, both of whom had employed
the inventor, and both of whom had express contracts providing that his inventions would
be their property. The question the Court resolved was simply one of fact: who was the in-
ventor working for at the time he developed the patented invention?
'Depending on how one counts, there were roughly ten or fifteen published opinions
before 1900. The counting depends on whether one treats cases involving hirings to invent
as involving a contract allocating invention rights. Today, hirings to invent would usually
be treated as such contractual allocations, but that was not the case in the nineteenth cen-
tury, so I did not include them in the count. For examples of cases, see note 207.
'See, for example, Phillips, The Law of Patents for Inventions at 342-57 (cited in note
33) (discussing patent assignment but not mentioning employment contract context).
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the employer. Although express contracts assigning inventions
certainly had become more common as a business practice, the
courts' increased reliance on implied contract notions reflected a
shift in the perception of the employment relationship away from
the status notions of master-servant law toward the contractual
notions of modern employment law. In other words, perceptions
may have changed as much as employment actually did. The ris-
ing significance of contract in allocating ownership of employee
inventions was a phenomenon of both changing legal discourse
and changing business practice.210 Contract came in the early
twentieth century to be the dominant legal description of the em-
ployment relationship,"' and this ultimately influenced the way
courts approached ownership of inventions and intellectual prop-
erty in employment.
The first published academic effort to catalogue and reconcile
the cases on ownership of inventions in the employment context,
which appeared in the 1903 Michigan Law Review, reflected the
ascendance of contract." The author asserted that ownership of
inventions was a question of contract, express or implied."3 The
fact of employment did not alter the inventor's property in his in-
ventions "outside the scope of the employment,"1 4 the author con-
tended, but an implied contract could. The author did not explain
how courts determined which inventions were developed within
the scope of employment and which were not. Nor did he suggest
when an implied contract allocated invention rights. Rather, he
said only that the essential considerations included what the em-
"'Prior to 1890, only a small proportion of patent assignments were made by employ-
ees assigning their patents to their employers. Although the proportion of employee-
inventors who transferred patent rights to their firms increased after 1890, the numbers
remained small into the early twentieth century. See Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, Inventors,
Firms, and the Market for Technology (cited in note 36).
"' John Orth has recently written about the development of the law of contract from its
origins in the common law of property. He argues that the reconceptualization of labor in
contract terms over the course of the nineteenth century played an important role in the
development of the law of contract generally, and that the persistence of archaic property
notions influenced the assumed content of the employment contract. Orth, Contract and
the Common Law (cited in note 20). On the evolution of contract as a legal concept and as
a social structure in the employment relationship, see Philip Selznick, Law, Society, and
Industrial Justice 52-72 (Russell Sage 1969).
.'. Cheever, 1 Mich L Rev at 384 (cited in note 152). On the tendency of scholars toward
systematization and abstraction in organizing whole fields of law during the 1870-1900
period, see Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Cri-
sis of Legal Orthodoxy 12-14 (Oxford 1992) ("Transformation II").
"' Cheever, 1 Mich L Rev at 385 (cited in note 152) ("The subject thus being limited to
one of contract, expressed or implied, it may be most conveniently treated by considering
it under two headings, depending upon whether the employee is specially hired to make or
perfect inventions, or makes them while engaged in the course of ordinary employment.').
"' Id at 384.
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ployee was hired to do and what rights, "expressed or implied,"
the employee had given to the employer.215 In case of doubt, such
as "Iw]here the employer and the employee both claim the inven-
tion[,] the presumption is prima facie in favor of the employer."2
This presumption in favor of employer ownership was prescrip-
tive rather than descriptive. In one appeal from a Patent Office
interference proceeding,"7 the District of Columbia court had said
that there was a presumption that the employer rather than the
employee was the inventor, but, as we have seen, there was no
similar presumption in the shop right, hiring-to-invent, and as-
signment contract cases." 8 What the article reflects, however, is
the typical formalist confidence that the emerging Langdellian
science of contract law could bring organization to the apparent
disorder in the caselaw in this area. Yet the law of contracts that
the author applied to the phenomenon of employee-inventors was
the formal, will-theory, pro-employer version of contract law that,
as we will see, courts applied everywhere but to employee-
inventors.
Thirty years later, the law of employee-inventors was well-
developed as a branch of the law of employment contracts, but
the caselaw remained in disarray and contained apparently in-
consistent outcomes. The lawyers' enthusiasm for contract law as
a great clarifying force, however, remained undimmed. The
author of an article in the early 1930s concluded that the "vexed
question" of employee ownership of inventions, on which the
cases were "far from harmonious," had at last been clarified by
the courts' recent determination that the question of ownership
"in all such cases is relatively simple, being that of the ordinary
contractual relation of Master and Servant, or employer and em-
ployee." '9 The Supreme Court's emphatic assertion in 1933 that
the shop right arose from the employment contract,22 ° and its vig-
orous pro-employer restatement of the principles of contract in-
25 Id at 385.
211Id at 386 (emphasis removed), citing Miller v Kelley, 18 DC App 163 (1901).
21 "An interference is a proceeding the object of which is determination of priority in
invention." Peter D. Rosenberg, Patent Law Basics § 10.03[1] at 10-34 (Clark, Boardman,
Callaghan 1992). It allows one who claims to have been the first inventor of a patentable
idea to challenge, on the grounds of priority of invention, the issuance of a patent to an-
other.
'Miller, 18 DC App at 170. See note 127 and accompanying text.
"Henry C. Workman, Rights of Employers and Employees in Inventions Made by the
Latter, 20 ABA J 538, 538-39 (1934).
'See text accompanying notes 120-21 (discussing Dubilier).
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terpretation applicable to employee invention cases, clearly
placed contract concepts in ascendance.
The rising significance of contract reflected not only a change
in legal discourse, but also a change in actual practice in the
workplace. As firms grew in size, as they began to invest in re-
search and development and as personnel management became
increasingly organized and bureaucratized, employers began to
be more systematic in their handling of employee-inventors."
Employers increasingly required that all employees who were
likely to invent sign agreements to assign to the employer any in-
ventions they might make.
A. Early Hostility Toward Contracts Assigning Invention
Rights, 1860-1920
The most striking characteristic of the early cases involving
contracts assigning future inventions to one's employer was the
courts' hostility toward them. The courts initially were reluctant
to find that such an agreement existed unless the evidence was
clear, and when an agreement did exist, most courts construed it
strictly against the employer. Although by 1855 the law was set-
tled that contracts to assign patents were enforceable,'2 at least
outside the employment context, courts used a variety of rules of
interpretation to make employees' pre-invention assignment
agreements difficult for employers to enforce.
This hostility existed in spite of the uncontroversial provi-
sion, in the Patent Act since its inception, that patents were as-
signable.2  Courts regarded as permissible and sensible that a
patentee would assign his patent to someone and then work with
the assignee to manufacture and sell the patented item.2m The
earliest reported cases about such arrangements involved part-
nerships; thus the legal framework was established as a phe-
nomenon of patent law, or the law of partnerships, not as an as-
" See text accompanying notes 201-05 (discussing Standard Parts).
'See text accompanying notes 116-19.
'The Supreme Court held in Kinsman v Parkhurst, 59 US 289, 293 (1855), that a
patentee's agreement to assign an existing patent to another, to manufacture the patented
invention on behalf of the other, and to share the profits was a valid contract not in re-
straint of trade. The Court also held in Littlefield v Perry, 88 US (21 Wall) 205 (1874), that
contracts to assign future inventions were enforceable, at least in connection with an as-
signment of an existing patent.
' Patent Act of 1793 § 4, 1 Stat 318, 322. See 16 US (3 Wheat) App n ii 655, 667 (1818)
(appendix written by Justice Story discussing assignability of patents). See also Littlefield,
88 US (21 Wall) at 214-15 (citing cases and discussing the Patent Act).
'See, for example, Kinsman, 59 US at 293-94.
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pect of the law of master and servant s.22 By the late nineteenth
century, when courts began to face contracts by employees to as-
sign patents to their employers, the assignability of patents and
the enforceability of pre-invention assignment agreements were
well-established aspects of the law and business of patent. Al-
though the Patent Act imposed a variety of procedural require-
ments on patent assignments,22 courts enforced, under a variety
of equitable doctrines, assignment agreements that did not com-
ply with the statutory requirements." Thus, when courts first
confronted employee-employer patent assignment agreements,
there was an established tradition of enforcing assignments.
The hostility toward contracts assigning employees' future
patents was articulated most pointedly in Aspinwall Manufactur-
ing Co v Gill,' an early and influential federal circuit court case
involving an inventor who assigned his patent to a manufactur-
ing firm and then went to work for the firm making the product.
The contract required that he assign future improvements to the
main patent, and the court enforced the agreement as reasonably
necessary to protect the purchaser's interest in the main patent.
Although the court enforced the agreement, Justice Bradley, sit-
ting as a circuit judge, suggested that such contracts must be
limited. "A naked assignment or agreement to assign,-in other
words, a mortgage on a man's brain, to bind all its future prod-
ucts,-does not address itself favorably to our consideration. "
This metaphor captured the fancy of many judges, who cited the
case as support for various rules construing assignment agree-
ments narrowly."
Courts developed essentially two strategies for declining to
enforce employees' assignment agreements. First, they would de-
cline to find the existence of an agreement to assign in the ab-
' See, for example, Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa 155, 166-67 (1868).
'Under the Patent Act, assignments were supposed to be in writing and recorded
with the Patent Office within a specified time after the alleged assignment. Patent Act of
1836 § 11, 5 Stat 117, 121. There were limits on the types of interests that could be as-
signed. See Gayler v Wilder, 51 US (10 How) 477, 494-95 (1850) (discussing rights of pat-
ent assignees and licensees to sue for infringement); Brooks v Byam, 4 F Cases 261, 267-
71 (Cir Ct D Mass 1843) (limiting divisibility of licenses in patents); Blanchard v Eldridge,
3 F Cases 624, 624-25 (Cir Ct E D Pa 1849) (limiting patent interests that may be as-
signed); Potter v Holland, 19 F Cases 1154, 1157-58"(1858) (explaining generally interests
in patents that may be transferred and the rights the transferee acquires).
'See, for example, Burr v De La Vergne, 102 NY 415, 7 NE 366, 368-69 (1886) (recog-
nizing oral assignment even though statute required it to be in writing); Blakeney v
Goode, 30 Ohio St 350, 357-61 (1876) (same).
'32 F 697 (Cir Ct D NJ 1887).
2' Id at 700.
' See, for example, Wege v Safe-Cabinet Co, 249 F 696, 705 (6th Cir 1918) (using the
metaphor, although finding it not true in the case).
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sence of a clear, written contract. Second, even when there was a
written contract, the courts would construe the coverage of such
agreements narrowly against the employer so as to exclude all
inventions that were either not directly related to the employee's
work or not clearly made during the term of the contract.
Notwithstanding the enforceability of patent assignments
generally, courts were from the start suspicious of employer
claims that employees had made such oral agreements. Among
the earliest reported decisions on the issue was the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's 1868 opinion in Slemmer's Appeal, 2 which de-
termined that one partner's invention of an oil refining process
was the property of the inventing partner alone, and that all the
evidence that he made the invention in conducting partnership
business gave the other partners only a license, not an ownership
interest. The decision rested mainly on a factual determination
about the nature of the parties' understanding. Nevertheless, it
suggested a difficult standard for establishing an enforceable con-
tract to assign ownership, because it found decisive the inventor-
partner's testimony that there was no such agreement.
A similar reluctance to recognize an employment agreement
to assign a patent appears in the first published Massachusetts
decision to address a written contract assigning an employee's fu-
ture patents, Hopedale Machine Co v Entwistle.' A machinist
under a one-year written employment contract agreed to assign
to his employer all inventions made during the employment. Af-
ter the expiration of the one-year contract, the employee contin-
ued to work and eventually made the invention in question.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the
obligation to assign the inventions expired with the written con-
tract. The court rejected the contention that the parties had
treated the written contract as if it were still in effect:
[I]t is not important, in an action upon it, that it has been
treated since as existing by acts on the part of Entwistle
which recognized it, or that oral statements have been made
by him that he was bound by it. They could not thus give it
efficiency. To hold otherwise would be to hold that a written
contract which by its terms had expired might still exist as
such. 5
'58 Pa 155, 166 (1868). Slemmer's Appeal is discussed in note 70.
' 133 Mass 443 (1882).
2Id at 443-44.
2Id at 444.
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Another example of judicial unwillingness to find an em-
ployee had contracted to assign his patent was Eustis Manufac-
turing Co v Eustis,23 6 an 1893 decision of the New Jersey Court of
Chancery. The contract in that case obligated the employee to
"give the said company the benefit of any and all patents for
cooking utensils made by or issued to him during the term of his
office and employment in said company ... ."2 The court con-
strued this language to grant a license only, not outright owner-
ship.2
8
Perhaps the most widely cited case to rule that a contract to
assign must be express and must be established on the basis of
clear evidence is Pressed Steel Car Co v Hansen, 9 a Third Circuit
decision from 1905. Hansen had started his career with the plain-
tiff firm as a $6 a week draftsman, and wound up as the chief en-
gineer in charge of the engineering, mechanical, and manufac-
turing departments. He was highly compensated; his salary rose
from $4,000 per year in 1900 to $10,000 a year in 1902, which
was a great deal of money in those days. There was no written
employment agreement. The employer alleged that the parties
had an oral contract that Hansen would assign all patents to the
firm, but Hansen denied it. The district court found the testimony
on this point in conflict. Both the district court and the court of
appeals decided that the alleged assignment agreement could not
be enforced because its existence had not been clearly proven.4°
It would be a mistake to think that the courts' unwillingness
to enforce assignment agreements they found to be vague was
simply an application of the general rule against awarding spe-
51 NJ Eq 565, 27 A 439 (1893).
227 A at 442.
Id at 442-43. Yet another case establishing a high threshold for proving an assign-
ment contract was Hale & Kilburn Manufacturing Co v Norcross, 199 Pa 283, 49 A 80
(1901). The employer alleged that there was an oral contract by which the employee
agreed to use "his inventive faculties" to improve the car seats his employer manufactured
and to "assign all [his] new constructions or improvements" to the firm. Because of the
conflicting testimony of the witnesses about the nature and existence of the alleged
agreement, the court refused to enforce it, explaining that "[s]pecific performance of this
contract could be decreed only after its existence had been shown by clear and precise evi-
dence." 49 A at 83-84.
137 F 403 (3d Cir 1905).
'Pressed Steel Car Co v Hansen, 128 F 444, 444-46, 453 (W D Pa 1904), affd, 137 F at
405-07. Fifteen years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court still adhered to a rule of con-
struction hostile to such contracts. "[Wihere the product of an inventive mind is sought to
be appropriated under an agreement to assign to another, the language of the agreement
must be clear and show an unmistakable intention that the particular matter covered by
the invention or patent is within the intention of the parties." White Heat Products Co v
Thomas, 266 Pa 551, 109 A 685, 686 (1920) (declining to order assignment to employer).
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cific performance of contracts that were vague or indefinite."4 The
general rule about specific performance was filled with exceptions
that would have encompassed employees' assignment agree-
ments, yet courts never mentioned these exceptions. Outside of
this context, a court would refuse to order specific performance
only where the contract was so vague or indefinite that the court
was unable to discern what the defendant needed to do. 2 Addi-
tionally, courts often would supply missing terms by reasonable
inference.' The agreements to assign employee inventions that
courts declined to enforce specifically were not so vague or indefi-
nite as to be unenforceable under the traditional rule. The uncer-
tainty in these cases was not about the terms-what invention,
when to assign it-but rather about whether the contract existed
at all.' Moreover, the courts seemed no more inclined to grant a
damages remedy than to order assignment, so the rule declining
enforcement of assignment agreements was not just the equity
court's reluctance to order specific performance. 5 The rule was
essentially a presumption against the existence of a contract, not
simply a rule about specific performance. It was a rule for em-
ployees' patent assignment agreements, not for all contracts.
Among the earliest of the second category of cases--constru-
ing an agreement strictly against the employer-was Joliet
Manufacturing Co v Dice,2" decided in 1883. The court stretched
to construe a contract in favor of an employee so as to avoid as-
signment. The contract required the employee to "work for the
best interest of the company in every way that he can, and in
" See, for example, Ham v Johnson, 55 Minn 115, 56 NW 584, 584-85 (1893) (denying
specific enforcement of an executory contract to convey land because the lots to be con-
veyed were not specifically described); James L. High, 2 A Treatise on the Law of Injunc-
tions § 1106 at 1091-92, § 1109 at 1095 (Callaghan 4th ed 1905) (stating that contracts
must be complete for court to grant specific performance); John Norton Pomeroy, A Trea-
tise on the Specific Performance of Contracts § 145 at 376-79 (Banks 3d ed 1926) (same).
"'See, for example, Work v Welsh, 160 Ill 468, 43 NE 719, 721 (1896) (granting specific
performance of contract to convey land, despite absence of sale price); Mudgett v Clay, 5
Wash 103, 31 P 424,426 (1892) (same).
'SSee, for example, Lester Agricultural Chemical Works v Selby, 68 NJ Eq 271, 59 A
247, 250 (1904) (granting specific performance of contract to sell land; supplying missing
price term by appraisal of market value); Lawson v Mullenix, 104 Md 156, 64 A 938, 943
(1906) (granting specific performance of contract to convey land; supplying missing time
for performance with reasonable time).
'See, for example, Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa at 166; Eustis Manufacturing Co, 27 A at
441.
" See, for example, Conway v White, 9 F2d 865, 866 (2d Cir 1921) ("It is of course well-
settled law that a contract to sell or transfer a patented right, like a contract to sell real
estate, may be specifically enforced. The reason is that there is no accurate measure of
damages, and a pecuniary payment is inadequate relief.").
2" 105 Ill 649 (1883).
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whatever way such aid can be given shall belong to the company,
that is, improvements (previous to this date not included) that he
may make or cause to be made."24 7 The employee had been hired
to manufacture harvesting equipment and had patented a piece
of equipment in his own name. The court stated the "general
rule" that "where .a mechanic, in laboring for an employer in the
construction of a machine, invents a valuable improvement, the
invention is the property of the inventor and not that of the em-
ployer."' 4 Noting that a hiring for the specific purpose of invent-
ing might give ownership of the invention to the employer, the
court said: "But the law inclines so strongly to the rule that the
invention shall be the property of its inventor, that nothing short
of a clear and specific contract to that effect will vest the property
of the invention in the employer, to the exclusion of the inven-
tor."49 Pointing out that the contract required the employee to
manufacture "shellers and mowers," the court concluded that the
employee's invention-a "check rower"-was not within the scope
of the contractY Similarly, in Hildreth v Duff, 1 a candy manu-
facturer, Hildreth, hired a mechanic to construct machines for
"sizing, shaping, cutting, wrapping and packing" molasses
candy." The contract provided that the mechanic would give his
employer "the full benefit and enjoyment of any and all inven-
tions and improvements, which I have made or may hereafter
make relating to machines or devices pertaining to said Hil-
dreth's business."' The court concluded that because Hildreth
was in the business of making candy, not machines, the contract
provided for him only to use the machines, not to own them out-
rightY
'7 Id at 650.
mId at 651.
2"Id at 651-52.
"Id at 652.
143 F 139 (Cir Ct W D Pa), affd, 148 F 676, 677 (3d Cir 1906).
2'148 F at 677.
20Id.
143 F at 141. See also Hazen Manufacturing Co v Wareham, 242 F 642 (6th Cir
1917) (construing narrowly a contract granting a license to the employer).
Johnson Furnace & Engineering Co v Western Furnace Co, 178 F 819, 821-22 (8th Cir
1910), was a similar case construing narrowly against the employer a contract to assign.
Parkinson, the organizer of the defendant company, had previously been employed as the
manager of the plaintiff firm. While so employed, he invented an improved furnace grate.
Shortly thereafter he quit his job and applied for a patent on his grate. The plaintiff firm,
his former employer, alleged he was obligated to assign the patent, both by the terms of
his oral employment agreement and under a written contract for which he was something
of a third-party beneficiary. The court rejected the firm's contention, finding that his hir-
ing was "general" and did not cover "the fruit of" his inventive genius. The court also
found that the contract did not cover Parkinson's inventions, but only Parkinson's em-
1190 [65:1127
The Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930
These were but a few of the numerous cases involving as-
signment agreements that courts construed in favor of the em-
ployee rather than force the employee to assign a patent. Others
include a 1914 Second Circuit case that construed narrowly a
contract by which an employee agreed to grant his employer an
exclusive license to all future inventions "devised or acquired by
him with relation to elevators and their appliances .... ".5 The
court held the provision covered inventions related to plunger
elevator control, but not inventions related to drilling holes for
plunger elevators, oil wells, and artesian wells. 6 Adopting the
popular metaphor from Aspinwall, the court opined that the em-
ployer's proposed construction of the agreement "would be an ex-
tremely harsh one; it might even be found unconscionable, for it
mortgages his inventive faculties to complainant for an indefinite
period subsequent to employment, in relation not only to eleva-
tors of the 'plunger' type, but to steam and electric elevators as
well." The next year, a federal court in Pennsylvania construed
narrowly a contract assigning the employee's future inventions.
The court held the provision covered generators and motors,
which the employer manufactured, but not devices for controlling
them, which the employer did not manufacture and instead pur-
chased for use on its motors.~
There were too many cases granting employee-inventors the
benefit of the doubt in contract interpretation to regard these as
exceptional. Nor can they be understood to rest on any rule other
than simple suspicion of employer efforts to divest employees of
their inventions. Although the cases were not anomalous, they
were not the only trend in the law. A significant minority of
courts were willing to enforce these same sorts of contracts. Over
time, the minority view became dominant.
B. Willing Enforcement of Assignment Agreements, 1895-1930
At the end of the nineteenth century, the number of reported
decisions enforcing employee patent assignments began steadily
to increase. In the first decade of the twentieth century, reported
opinions found contracts to assign future inventions supported by
ployer's inventions. Id at 823.
' Standaid Plunger Elevator Co v Stokes, 212 F 893, 896 (2d Cir 1914).
2Id at 897.
21 Id at 896.
Triumph Electric Co v Thullen, 225 F 293, 296-97 (E D Pa 1915). Other cases con-
struing assignment agreements narrowly so as to protect employees include National
Cash Register Co v Remington Arms Co, 242 NY 99, 151 NE 144, 145 (1926); White Heat
Products, 109 A at 686-87.
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sufficient consideration on the basis that the employee gained a
job, had access to valuable knowledge, and was paid. 9 As to the
notion that such contracts were against public policy, courts re-
garded contracts to assign future improvements related to the
employer's business as reasonably necessary to protect the em-
ployer's investment in the business °.26 And, as to the problem of
finding the terms sufficiently definite, courts found the requisite
definiteness in express written contracts, and even held ex-
changes of letters to constitute an agreement.2  Courts also up-
held related contracts, such as confidentiality agreements.2
Among the earliest and most cited cases was Hulse v Bon-
sack Machine Co, 21 in which the court found wanting many of the
arguments against enforcement of such contracts.2  It is a good
example of a trend that was manifested in other cases too numer-
ous to discuss. Hulse, a mechanic, was employed by the Bonsack
Machine Company, a manufacturer of cigarette-making ma-
chines, under a written contract that claimed "for the exclusive
use of the said company" any "improvement in cigarette ma-
chines" the employee might develop during his employment "or at
any time thereafter." Hulse did not want to assign an invention
he made after leaving Bonsack's employment, but the court con-
cluded the contract compelled it. The opinion's description of the
equities of the situation suggested that the judge viewed the
main problem in the case as being how to protect the firm's re-
search program from the depredations of this overly enterprising
'See, for example, Mississippi Glass Co v Franzen, 143 F 501, 506-07 (3d Cir 1906)
(holding employment, training and salary to be sufficient consideration); Brown Perfection
Tube Co v Brown, 233 F 676 (2d Cir 1916) (enforcing agreement to assign inventions
against employee whose original patent was the basis of the company's business; employee
apparently was founder of company); Detroit Lubricator Co v Lavigne Manufacturing Co,
151 Mich 650, 115 NW 988, 990-91 (1908) (holding that employment is sufficient consid-
eration for agreement to assign all inventions "which might result from .. . employment in
the nature of machinery, tools, or devices, to be used in connection with [employers] busi-
ness"); Parker Rust-Proof Co v Allen, 231 Mich 69, 203 NW 890, 890-91 (1925) (holding
that employment is sufficient consideration for agreement to assign certain inventions).
'See, for example, Wege, 249 F at 704-05 (rejecting the criticism that an agreement to
assign future inventions after termination of employment is "a mortgage on a man's
brainr " because "if such safeguard were not available, the inventor might through knowl-
edge obtained in his employment evade the contract [to assign inventions during employ-
ment] later and render it valueless") (citations omitted).
" 'See, for example, Portland Iron Works v Willett, 49 Or 245, 89 P 421, 423-24 (1907)
(letters); Fullman v Steel City Electric Co, 2 F2d 4, 5 (3d Cir 1924) (express contract);
Conway, 9 F2d at 866-67 (express contract).
'See Thibodeau v Hildreth, 124 F 892, 893 (1st Cir 1903) (enforcing agreement re-
quiring employee to preserve employer's trade secrets and to assign inventions).
'65 F 864 (4th Cir 1895).
Id at 867.
Id at 866.
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employee.2" The court found Hulse's salary to be sufficient con-
sideration for the contract because the employment gave the in-
ventor the time, opportunity, and materials necessary to invent.
The court rejected the contention that the pre-invention assign-
ment contract was unconscionable. 7
The court also rejected the argument that contracts assign-
ing rights to all future inventions were against public policy be-
cause they restrained trade or stifled invention. The public inter-
est, thought the judge, lay in promoting innovation, which could
be best achieved by protecting the firm, not the employee: "Here
we have the case of an ingenious man, without opportunity of de-
veloping his talent, and struggling under difficulties, enabled by
this contract to secure employment in a large and prosperous cor-
poration, where he could give his inventive faculties full play."'
Without the contract, the employee would never have been hired.
"Then, in all human probability, the public would have lost the
benefit of his discovery. In this point of view, a contract of this
character cannot be said to be against public policy."269 The case
rebuffed all the arguments that were used in that era to chal-
lenge invention assignment agreements. More interesting, its ra-
tionale is plainly instrumental; the court thought it was promot-
ing invention, just as did earlier courts who rejected assignment
agreements.
The Hulse court's willingness to enforce assignment agree-
ments was premised on an early view that employment provided
opportunities for invention. That early sense evolved over the
course of twenty years into a recognizably modem understanding
of the collective nature of research and development. The modem
perspective is fully articulated in the Seventh Circuit's 1911 deci-
sion in National Wire Bound Box Co v Healy, 7° which held that
the sole stockholders of a start-up company had a fiduciary duty
to assign to the corporation patented improvements on the com-
'"The improvement would be his own idea. But it owed its suggestion and origin, its
progressive development and perfection, to the business, the practical working, the oppor-
tunity afforded by the company. When, therefore, the company, taught by costly experi-
ence, determined to protect itself from the discovery and improvements by its own ser-
vants, it did a natural and reasonable thing, and, when it protected itself by a covenant in
advance of any employment with those seeking its service, it did a fair thing." Id at 867-
68.
2Id.
2Id at 868.
2 Id.
' 189 F 49 (7th Cir 1911).
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pany's product that they developed after the company terminated
their employment.Y
The opinion justified a broad duty to assign with a lengthy
explanation of the collective nature of invention.
An invention is not something that, but for the particular in-
ventor or inventors, would not have been. Inventions come
along as the discovery of gas deposits come along-the con-
tribution of some particular person to the world's knowl-
edge-but if not by that person, then, in the course of time,
and usually in a very short time, by some one else.2
The company should justly own the individual's patents because
the employee had only an idea for a technological advance; the
firm created the value in that idea. The court explained:
[T]he exploration of the laws of nature and mechanics, for
something that will aid a specific commercial or business
end, practically and commercially is not different from explo-
rations for mineral or gas deposits to a like commercial end.
Neither has any value until it is obtained. Both create a
value that did not exist before they were obtained.73
Reasoning that invention was a long and arduous endeavor
of many contributors, not the product of a stroke of individual
genius, the Healy court concluded that agreements to assign fu-
ture inventions ought to be treated no differently than agree-
ments to assign any other property that someone may acquire in
the future. 4 Finally, the court invoked the public interest in the
systematic advancement of technology, which would be best
served by giving corporations control over employee patents:
"Protection for the future requires that inventions already con-
trolled be not undermined and diverted by other inventions along
the same line."75
The special rules for interpreting employee-inventors' as-
signment contracts met their death in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Standard Parts. The case involved a written employment
contract between a manufacturer of automobile springs for Ford
Motor Company and William Peck, a designer of machinery. The
contract obligated Peck "to devote his time to the development of
" Id at 54-56.
2nId at 55.
' Id at 56.
' Id at 56-57 (distinguishing earlier pro-employee cases by emphasizing that employ-
ment contract in Healy expressly addressed the topic).
" Id at 55.
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a process and machinery for the production of the front spring
now used on the product of the Ford Motor Company."276 Relying
on established caselaw, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the contract
simply as a hiring to make improvements, not an agreement to
transfer ownership of the invention to the employer. The court
said that in order for a contract to divest the employee of the en-
tire ownership of the invention and the possibility of future profit
from it, "that result ought to be expressed in the clearest and
plainest words."27 '
The Supreme Court disagreed. Based on the contract provi-
sion requiring the employee to develop a process and a machine,
the Court thought the product was the property "of him who en-
gaged the services and paid for them ..... 7 To interpret the con-
tract as allowing Peck any property right in the invention, the
Court thought, would "take from the company the advantage of
its exclusive use and subject the company to the rivalry of com-
petitors."279 Peck's notion, which accorded the employee-inventor
an almost inalienable property right, would be unfair to the em-
ployer. The Court explained:
Peck... asserts, though stimulated to services by the Hess
Company and paid for them, doing nothing more than he
was engaged to do and paid for doing, that the product of the
services was so entirely his property that he might give as
great a right to any member of the mechanical world as to
the one who engaged him and paid him-a right to be used
in competition with the one who engaged him and paid him.
... We cannot assent to this.
In no uncertain terms, Standard Parts aimed to put an end
to the whole line of cases in which courts had construed any am-
biguity about assignment of invention rights in favor of the em-
ployee. Standard Parts made clear that a hiring to invent con-
veyed to the employer not only a license to use the invention but
also the entire ownership interest in the invention. The Court
also left no doubt that contracts requiring employees to assign
existing or future inventions were no longer to be construed in fa-
vor of the employee.28' The Court did so in terms that evidenced a
2" 264 US at 59.
'Peck v Standard Parts Co, 282 F 443, 446 (6th Cir 1922).
'8 264 US at 59.
7" Id at 60.
2"Id.
"'Modem cases from many states have stated that contracts assigning inventions,
even inventions developed after the termination of employment, may be enforced so as to
protect the employer. See, for example, Ingersoll-Rand Co v Ciavatta, 110 NJ 609, 542 A2d
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complete rejection of the Romantic notion of the law protecting
the hero inventor. It also represented a wholehearted embrace of
the master-servant rule that the master presumptively contracts
for all the benefits of the servant's work. And the Court obviously
thought it did so for the greater good of American technological
development.
The state courts neither immediately nor unequivocally
abandoned the pre-Standard Parts habit of construing employee
patent assignment agreements in favor of the employee-inventor.
In the ensuing decades, the unruly common law process contin-
ued to produce decisions reflecting various points of view on a
spectrum between hostility and indulgence toward such con-
tracts. Nevertheless, the tide clearly turned against employee-
inventors. Courts construed ambiguous written contracts to find
an employee obligated to assign inventions and, unlike before,
found implied contracts to assign based on common practice. 2
As recently as 1991, for instance, a Pennsylvania federal
court decision analyzing the rights of a professor who developed
the acne treatment Retin-A discussed seventy years of Pennsyl-
vania law on employee-inventors. Although noting the old deci-
879, 892, 895 (1988) (explaining that employer has an interest "in protecting confidential
information, trade secrets, and, more generally, its time and expenditures in training and
imparting skills and knowledge to its paid work force"; holding that agreement did not ap-
ply to invention in question, but only because no plausible liberal construction could
achieve that result); Cubic Corp v Marty, 185 Cal App 3d 438, 229 Cal Rptr 828 (1986) (en-
forcing an assignment agreement over employee's objection that it did not cover the inven-
tion in question, was unconscionable, and was not supported by sufficient consideration).
Courts will, however, examine the reasonableness of a contract's time limits and of the
subject matter of inventions covered. See Ingersoll-Rand, 542 A2d at 888-92 (collecting
cases).
To the extent that there remain special rules for employees' pre-invention assignment
agreements, most of them are the product of state statutory reforms. See, for example, Cal
Lab Code § 2870 (West 1989 & Supp 1998) (stating that an agreement requiring an em-
ployee to assign inventions developed without using employer resources is, with signifi-
cant exceptions, unenforceable).
'See Marshall v Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co, 175 F2d 215, 217 (3d Cir 1949) (finding
implied contract to assign patent based in part on hiring to invent where there "was a cus-
tom ... for employees of the defendant to assign inventions to it"); Teets v Chromalloy Gas
Turbine Corp, 83 F3d 403, 408 (Fed Cir) (finding implied contract to assign), cert denied,
117 S Ct 513 (1996); Total Containment Inc v Environmental Products Inc, 23 USPQ 2d
1305, 1306 (E D Pa 1992) (enforcing express contract to assign); Fessler v Permachem
Corp, 144 NYS2d 232, 234 (NY S Ct 1955) (enforcing express contract to assign based on
written employment agreement); A&C Engineering Co v Atherholt, 355 Mich 677, 95
NW2d 871, 875 (1959) (finding complaint adequately averred employer ownership of in-
vention although only an implied contract); Andreaggi v Relis, 171 NJ Super 203, 408 A2d
455, 464 (1979) (enforcing express contract to assign); Mainland Industries, Ine v Timber-
land Machines and Engineering Corp, 58 Or App 585, 649 P2d 613, 616 (1982) (enforcing
oral agreement to assign patent); Cubic Corp, 229 Cal Rptr at 833 (enforcing express con-
tract to assign).
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sions' reluctance to find contracts to assign inventions, the court
concluded that a jury could find, based on a policy manual, an
unsigned form patent assignment contract, and conflicting evi-
dence of past practice, that the professor had an implied contract
to assign all his inventions to the University.' After Standard
Parts, courts seldom invoked presumptions against the enforce-
ability of assignment contracts; most of the cases that declined to
enforce a contract did so simply because the existence of any
agreement had not been proven, not because of ambiguity in its
terms.'"
Over the course of the last seventy-five years, employee con-
tracts allocating ownership in employee ideas have been assimi-
lated into the law of contracts generally and employment con-
tracts in particular. Courts decline to enforce an assignment if
they find no contract to exist, just as they decline to enforce any
other alleged contract unless the contract can be proved. But the
evolving law of implied-in-fact contracts has proven to be a useful
tool for employers to invoke in the absence of an express contract
and nothing in the law of implied contract reflects the nineteenth
century concern with protecting against "a mortgage on the
workman's brain."
CONCLUSION
In an era when judges and treatise writers referred to and
obviously regarded most employees as servants, employees who
invented were usually neither so called nor so treated. Even as
industrialization undermined the independence of artisans and
the law came to deem knowledge and control of the production
process to be the right of the firm rather than the prerogative of
skilled labor, employees retained significant legal rights to their
ideas if they were embodied in patented inventions. The courts'
perception of the inventive employee's class position certainly
made a difference in how the employee-inventor was treated. The
doctrines described here called for extremely particularized, fact-
intensive inquiry, where perception of whether the employee was
University Patents, Inc v Kligman, 762 F Supp 1212, 1220-29 (E D Pa 1991).
'See, for example, Bandag, Inc v Morenings, 259 Iowa 998, 146 NW2d 916, 923
(1966); Gemco Engineering & Manufacturing Co, Inc v Henderson, 82 Ohio App 324, 77
NE2d 742, 743-44 (1947). In one case, in which the court noted the desirability of con-
struing such contracts strictly, nevertheless the court ruled that the employee had to as-
sign the patents in question. US Colloid Mill Corp v Meyers, 6 F Supp 283, 287-88 (S D
NY 1934) ("Contracts whereby one man sells products of his mind to somebody else are to
be rather strictly construed. Otherwise we should run into the difficulty of a man mort-
gaging his own mind, a thing which is to be avoided. Otherwise also we should run into
the difficulty of hampering the development of inventions.").
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a man of "inventive genius" or a "mere mechanic" appeared to
compel the legal conclusion that followed. If the judges perceived
the inventive employee as a man like Eli Whitney or Thomas
Edison, they found it hard to treat him like a servant. However,
once employer lawyers disabused judges of the inventor-hero im-
age in favor of the modern vision of inventive employees working
in a big, employer-financed laboratory, the law began to change.
It would be a vast oversimplification to suggest that Tay-
lorism and the change in the cultural perception of invention
from the inventor-hero to Bell Labs were the only catalysts of
change. The influence did not go in one direction from culture to
law; rather it went from culture to law and then back again. Le-
gal categories also affected cultural conceptions. The Patent Of-
fice's bureaucratic insistence on the existence of an individual in-
ventor no doubt influenced the way that employers and employ-
ees perceived who had been the inventor in fact. Moreover, the
rise of contract in the late nineteenth century certainly changed
the way employers did business with their workforce. Addition-
ally, the spread of the corporate form of business ownership em-
phasized for courts the corporate, or collective, nature of work
and idea ownership.
This is an area where law and culture cross-fertilized one an-
other in their creation of and reaction to social class. If a judge
could not see an inventive man as part of the working class, the
judge vastly increased the employee's chances of becoming an en-
trepreneur if he was not one already. Once judges began to see
inventive employees as employees first and inventors second, it
became much harder for the employee to capitalize on his ideas.
m See text accompanying note 109.
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